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Introduction
Anticipating the Future
How can global climate change be mitigated and what roles do international nego-
tiations, businesses, cities and consumers play? In what ways could the EU and its 
member states constructively engage with China, India and Russia? Will organiza-
tions such as the UN, NATO and the EU succeed in adapting their strategies to 
the changing nature of  crises? How can global energy security be achieved? Will 
the G8 soon be a G20? Or, summing it up differently: what will our globe look 
like in 2020?
Answering these questions is both a risky and simultaneously fruitful endeavor. It 
is commonsensical to note that the pressing problems of  the coming decades can 
no longer be solved by individual states alone. To successfully tackle them, we 
have to understand regional and global realities in order to find effective ways of  
burden-sharing and pooling capacities and strengths. Against this background, 
the DGAP’s 2nd Alumni Conference “Anticipating the Future” saw the gather-
ing of  some 80 Alumni from the Forum’s international network of  young lead-
ers in Berlin in November 2008. During the conference, participants discussed 
future scenarios and strategic options in the fields of  European security, energy, 
climate change and global trade. The conference promoted mutual understanding 
of  shared problems and was therefore an important step in the right direction of  
finding joint solutions.
Six of  the eight presentations that were given in one of  the four panels can be 
found in an updated version in the following pages. Claudia Major’s article starts 
off  the set of  chapters with her contribution which was presented in the panel 
on the future European security architecture. She assesses the crisis management 
capacities of  the EU, NATO and the UN with regard to the comprehensive ap-
proach and comes to the conclusion that the current situation is characterized by 
two competing ends, namely effectiveness and legitimacy.
Based on the lectures in the panel on energy security, the second part of  the con-
ference proceedings features the findings of  Stephan Renner and Dmitry Udalov. 
Renner discusses the prospects of  the European Union’s policies to increase 
energy savings and energy efficiency. In doing so, he provides crucial insights 
into a policy field that is largely characterized by discussions of  diversification of  
energy flows and an increase in renewable energies. The 20-20-20 target of  the EU, 
according to Renner, is a case in point because the former seeks to address the 
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area of  energy security from different angles. More specifically, the EU’s approach 
seeks a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% share of  renewables 
in energy consumption and a 20% saving in future energy demand by 2020. That 
energy security on a European but also global level will still significantly depend 
on the supply of  fossil fuels is then highlighted by Udalov. As of  today, Russian 
natural gas accounts for more than 40 per cent of  European gas imports. These 
figures are expected to increase in the coming years in the light of  decreased gas 
production in the EU. Contrary to most Western media reports this will, however, 
not inevitably make Europe more vulnerable, says Udalov. According to his assess-
ment not only does Russia need European technology and investment in upstream 
technologies in order to increase production, it will also be able to increase gas ex-
ports to the EU, if  it curbs consumption at home. Given that energy efficiency in 
Russia is still more than twice as low as in the EU there is a considerable potential 
to benefit from investment in energy-saving measures.
Closely linked to energy security in Europe as well as on a global level is the 
complex of  climate change. As Meade Harris demonstrates in her analysis, the 
European Union and its member states have the unique chance of  combining cli-
mate change efforts with a quantum leap in green technologies, thereby creating a 
truly low carbon economy. Drawing on the example of  the United Kingdom, she 
points out that neither a significant increase in renewable energy nor the invest-
ment in technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) will alone suffice 
to achieve the EU’s climate change goals. According to her, only a combination 
of  CCS, renewable energies and atomic energy will be able to successfully realize a 
viable climate protection policy.
The two remaining contributions by Esra Pakin and Robert Mudida address the 
issue of  the future economic order by looking at the prospects of  the Gulf  states 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. Critically revisiting the media hype of  the 
United Arab Emirates and its neighbors, Pakin points to the fragility of  today’s 
economic success in the Gulf  states. She not only highlights the fact that the eco-
nomic success of  these states is largely based on energy exports but also addresses 
related problems. Following her findings, the pace of  economic diversification is 
still too low, the local currencies too fragile and dependent on the US-Dollar and 
the productivity too reliant on the import of  skilled workers. To sustain current 
growth levels it will therefore be crucial for the affected states to invest into the 
education of  their citizens rather than relying on foreign labor.
In his study of  Sub-Saharan Africa, Robert Mudida points to the dire economic 
situation in most African countries where large parts of  the population still live in 
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abject poverty. Besides forced macro-economic reforms based on the Washington 
Consensus, Mudida lists the absence of  institutional reform as one of  the key rea-
sons for the poor economic record of  African countries over the last two decades. 
Against the background of  the low level of  integration into the global marketplace, 
the author suggests to increase efforts to initiate a ‘regionalism from below’ which 
would allow for increased economic integration in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Besides the presentations in the panels, the Alumni Conference celebrated the 3rd 
anniversary of  DGAP’s “International Forum on Strategic Thinking”. With the 
Robert Bosch Stiftung as its main patron, the Forum is currently DGAP’s main 
instrument for promoting young professionals and scholars in the area of  for-
eign and security policy. During the last three years the Forum has succeeded in 
increasingly focusing on “soft security risks” in its work, i. e. by addressing issues 
such as global climate change, demography, migration and epidemics. Further-
more, the program’s activities have been successfully expanded to include par-
ticipants from strategically important regions such as the Middle East, Asia and 
Africa. The Forum’s main goal is bringing together future decision-makers from 
different regions and cultural backgrounds to exchange perspectives, promote 
innovative ways of  thinking and to jointly develop common solutions to global 
challenges.
The present conference proceedings summarize the main findings and results of  
DGAP’s 2nd Alumni Conference “Anticipating the Future.” We hope that they 
will provide the reader with some fresh ideas and insights which are based on the 
results of  three days of  intense debate and networking as well as meeting old and 
new friends.
David Bosold and Kathrin Brockmann
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Panel I: Scenarios and Strategic Options for a European 
Security Architecture
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United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI)
Chair: Henning Riecke, Head, Program European Foreign and Security Policy, 
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Discussant
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Discussant
Summary
Björn Seibert
The period since the end of  the Cold War has seen both change and continuity in 
the European Security Architecture. The architecture remains unchanged in that 
Europe still lacks a hegemonic power. European security thus continues to be 
strongly dominated by regional organizations. What did however change since the 
end of  the Cold War is that Europeans increasingly started organizing themselves 
around a solely European organization – the European Union (EU) – as opposed 
to a transatlantic alliance in the institutional form of  NATO. The EU, while al-
ready dominating most other political spheres – from economics to justice affairs 
– has increasingly developed an interest in including military security in its task. 
This is posing a growing challenge to NATO, which dominated the European 
security architecture during the Cold War, largely unopposed. Unsurprisingly, this 
has caused increasing competition and rivalry between the two organizations, as 
both organizations are now assigned to undertake similar military tasks.
International Forum on 
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While the tasking of  both organizations has caused both friction and inefficien-
cies, it also allowed for comparing both organizations’ approaches to similar 
military tasks. This was the starting point of  the first paper presented in the 
panel. Looking at crisis management operations, Claudia Major’s paper sought to 
compare the different approaches the European Union, NATO and the United 
Nations (UN) take to crisis management operations. Outlining that the chang-
ing characteristics of  crises require new answers, the paper highlighted that crisis 
management operations have changed in three dimensions. First, the spectrum of  
tasks has broadened compared to traditional peacekeeping. Second, the periods 
of  engagement have been extended and finally the number of  actors involved has 
significantly increased. As a result, crisis management operations have become 
more complex, a problem that all three organizations have to deal with. Given 
this complexity, there is no single model used to achieve a comprehensive ap-
proach to crisis management operations. In addition, all three organizations face 
different challenges inherent to their organizational setting. The European Union, 
which has at its disposal a broad range of  civilian and military instruments, faces 
challenges pertaining to the coherence between the instruments of  the different 
pillars (e. g. first pillar vs. second pillar) and between civilian and military instru-
ments. Thus, the author finds, the EU is unable to make full use of  its potential 
for crisis management operations. For NATO, the challenges are different ac-
cording to the author. As a military organization, NATO does not have civilian 
means at its disposal. It thus needs to rely on external cooperation with civilian 
actors, including international organizations, making it more difficult for NATO 
to develop the necessary concepts. The United Nations has sought to adapt to 
the new challenges since the late 1980s. Its operations have thus increasingly be-
come multidimensional. Yet the size of  the organization, as well as parallel struc-
ture and institutional rivalry has made the implementation of  the comprehensive 
approach in crisis management operations difficult. The author concludes by 
arguing that the three institutions’ performance in a comprehensive approach in 
crisis management operations has thus far been mixed. However, given that there 
is no alternative to the comprehensive approach in crisis management, so the 
author argues, failure to manage complex crises risks undermining the legitimacy 
of  the individual organizations.
The second paper presented by Saponti Baroowa sought to take a look at the po-
tential for a strategic partnership between the European Union and three major 
international actors – India, China and Russia. The author points out that while 
the EU has been successful in establishing summit-level dialogues, it has achieved 
very little tangible results beyond joint statements. This is partly caused by the 
perception that the EU is an economic power rather than a security actor. Yet the 
Summary
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author sees increasing potential for upgrading the existing relationships, especially 
the relationship of  the European Union with India. Importantly, such a relation-
ship could also increasingly focus on security matters. The EU’s relationship with 
China will continue to become more important, believes the author, but it re-
mains to be seen whether it will focus more on non-trade related subjects includ-
ing security affairs. Finally, the EU’s relationship with Russia will remain difficult, 
especially after the recent war in Georgia, but the author does not anticipate ma-
jor upsets in the relations given mutual interests. The author concludes by arguing 
that despite the difference in strategic interests, priorities and threat assessments, 
it remains important for the EU to co-opt all regional powers to work together 
towards a more rule-based international order.
While the papers and the subsequent discussion focused on a wide range of  im-
portant matters related to the European security structure, neither fully addressed 
the increasingly difficult and evolving relationship between the EU and NATO. 
Yet, the panel provided an important overview over certain aspects of  the Euro-
pean security structure.
Participants of the first panel in DGAP’s Hans Dohnanyi Room
International Forum on 
Strategic Thinking 10
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Comprehensive Approaches of the EU, NATO and the UN—
Remedy to Address the New Challenges in International 
Crisis Management?
Claudia Major
Introduction1
The changing nature of  crises in terms of  threats and risks, tasks, means to ad-
dress them, time lines, and actors involved has forced security actors, be they na-
tional or multinational, to reconsider their responses. One answer has been labeled 
“comprehensive approach” (CA). As a generic term, it describes an all-encompass-
ing response to both, new and ongoing demands in crisis management. It intends 
to promote the external and internal coordination of  policy instruments and the 
coherence of  common objectives between different actors. However, in reality the 
approach has not been transferred into a single, clear-cut doctrine, guiding intra- 
and interorganizational affairs. Quite the opposite, it subsumes a number of  very 
heterogeneous concepts and instruments generated by national governments and 
international organizations to reinvigorate the way they plan and carry out crisis 
management operations. Thus, the era of  effective interorganizationalism is still to 
come.
In the light of  this diversity the aim of  this paper is twofold: On a conceptual level, 
it aims to clarify the main issues in current crisis management discussed under the 
label of  “comprehensive approaches.” On an empirical level, the paper asks how 
international organizations (IO), here NATO, the EU and the UN, aim to respond 
to the general need of  CA. In terms of  implementation, it is worth underlining 
that CA still is a comparatively young area. Hence, reliable and meaningful empiri-
cal data to assess the implementation of  CA’s for specific actors like the three IOs 
under study here have not yet been sufficiently generated and made accessible. 
Especially, more often than not “Lessons Learned” reports are classified.
I. New Crises and New Responses—Setting the Scene for CA
I.1. The Changing Character of Crises
The changing character of  crises has forced security actors to refine their way to 
address them. As a result, international crisis management has changed in three di-
mensions over the past years. First, the spectrum of  tasks has expanded. If  tradi-
 This article is deduced from a larger study: Christian Mölling/Claudia Major, Research Note: International Organisa-
tions in Crisis Management—Comprehensive approaches towards coordination and coherence? Textbook Contribution 
to the Workshop “Inter-ministerial Cooperation,” 1–3 July 2008, Federal College for Security Studies, Berlin.
Claudia Major
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tional peacekeeping focused on containment and reduction of  military escalation, 
contemporary crisis management aims at a social, political, and economic trans-
formation to reach a comprehensive conflict resolution.2 Consequently, the range 
of  tasks today comprises humanitarian aid, physical protection of  individuals, and 
ensuring the rule of  law and functioning of  political institutions to the establish-
ment of  stable and self-sustainable social and economic structures.
Secondly, this increasing set of  tasks coincides with expanding timelines of  crisis 
management. In conceptual and practical terms crisis management spans today 
from the initial phase of  conflict prevention, the actual crisis management encom-
passing humanitarian intervention, peace building and peacekeeping to post-con-
flict management. Depending on the phase, the challenges involved in dealing with 
the conflict vary. The management is further complicated by the need to manage 
the junction between the different phases, which moreover often overlap.
Third, not only the tasks, but also the number of  actors involved has increased sig-
nificantly.3 This is partly due to the broadened spectrum of  tasks involved. In vari-
ous phases of  crisis management, specific instruments and expertise are required 
that no single actor is able to supply on its own.4 Additionally, by involving various 
state and non-state actors, the political legitimacy of  an international engagement 
increases. Finally, actors from the crisis region itself  become increasingly involved. 
Their ownership or influence related to the resolution of  a conflict is key to ensure 
its sustainability. In addition to the local government and administration, this ap-
plies to political, religious, ethnic, and other social groups, as well as the private 
sector, the media, militias, organized crime, and relevant forces from neighboring 
regions.
Due to this expansion of  tasks, timelines and actors, as well as the enhanced 
interaction of  actors and tasks, the complexity of  crisis management has increased 
tremendously. Thus, crisis management has become foremost complexity man-
agement. The internal and external coordination of  all available instruments and 
actors, their timely and appropriate deployment in the various conflict phases, and 
the specification of  common mission objectives have become of  paramount im-
portance to allow for a successful crisis response. Put differently, what is needed is 
a common, multidimensional strategy that coordinates the wide range of  interna-
tional responses to crises.
2 In Larger Freedom, Report of  the UNSG, 2005, but also European Council: The European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
2003.
3 Cedric H. de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions (Security 
in Practice no. 5, NUPI report), Oslo 2007, p. 5.
4 See European Council, European Security Strategy, Brussels 2003.
Comprehensive 
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As a conceptual answer to this daunting challenge, the so called “Comprehensive 
Approach” has been promoted by both national and international actors. They in-
creasingly favor the approach as a blueprint to reinvigorate the way crisis response 
should be planned and carried out. It is expected to enhance both the efficiency 
and the legitimacy of  crisis management by harmonizing the interaction and inter-
dependence of  tasks and actors involved.
I.2. Diverging Concepts
However, both at the conceptual level and in the implementation, the Compre-
hensive Approach poses challenges that tend to be underestimated. First of  all, 
there is no single and coherent model. Instead, a multitude of  different and partly 
contradictory concepts for a Comprehensive Approach have emerged in recent 
years. While most actors today acknowledge the necessity for better coordination 
and collective efforts, their approaches diverge significantly regarding priorities, 
means and suggested end-states of  crisis management. Therefore it may be appro-
priate to speak in plural about Comprehensive Approaches. Moreover, strategies 
and models can signify de facto a comprehensive approach without explicitly using 
the term. This points towards terminological variations that risk causing confusion 
and create difficulties when attempting to link or compare particular approaches.
I.3. The Comprehensive Approach and the Problems Ahead
This fragmentation along several lines also points to the prospects of  common 
strategies. Commonly defined goals and coordination often exist only in general 
The panel on a future European Security Architecture
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terms. Instead, diverging objectives and interests give rise to conflicting interaction 
between actors and tasks.5 This can be categorized along the lines of  interaction:
Horizontal interaction describes the interaction of  different tasks or actors at 
the same level of  hierarchy, be it in the field or at the strategic level. The most 
prominent example is the strained relationship between the civilian and military 
approaches of  crises response. Civilian-military cooperation is further compli-
cated by the different objectives and organizational cultures of  the actors involved 
which are often only difficult to reconcile. However, there are also discernible 
tensions within these two supposedly homogeneous domains. For the military, the 
differences between national rules of  engagement in peacekeeping operations, but 
also in military cultures underline the limitations of  multinational or multiservice 
interoperability. In the civilian sphere, the interacting activities but diverging goals 
related to human rights protection, political reform, and economic development 
frequently spur conflicts over responsibilities, resources and relevance ranking.
Vertical interaction refers to the interaction between the field level and the strategic 
level of  a crisis response mission. There are usually different perspectives on prob-
lems depending on whether they are seen from the point of  view of  the mission 
operating in the field or the institutions in the capital or headquarters that exercise 
political control and strategic guidance. This may result, for example, in unrealistic 
orders, delayed decision-making, or inadequate allocation of  resources.7
Furthermore, at both the vertical and the horizontal levels of  interaction, prob-
lems arise not only out of  functional or cultural differences, but also from par-
ticular interests and competition between the various entities for resources and 
influence.
II. Comprehensive Approaches Applied: the EU, UN and NATO
Comprehensive approaches have developed at the international and domestic 
levels. At the international level, on which this paper focuses, the UN, the EU, 
and NATO have developed individual concepts to implement comprehensive 
approaches in order to address the growing complexity of  missions and to im-
prove their own limited success in tackling crises. The UN designed the concept 
of  “Integrated Missions,” the EU has developed the “Civil-Military Coordination” 
 Major, EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of  EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 (EU-ISS 
Occasional Paper no. 72), Paris, September 2008; Karsten Friis, Pia Jarmyr, Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and 
opportunities in complex crisis management (Security in Practice no. 11, NUPI Report), Oslo 2008.
 Kristin M. Haugevik, B. de Carvalho, Civil-Military Co-operation in Multinational and Interagency Operations (Security 
in Practice. no. 2, NUPI Report), Oslo 2007.
 Major, EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of  EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 (cf. note ).
Comprehensive 
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and NATO has recently formulated the “Comprehensive Approach.” Although 
these concepts are still blueprints, they are crucial in that they indicate not only the 
willingness and increasing ability of  the IO to adapt to current challenges but also 
display the degree to which they are able to cooperate. Here, the similarity of  the 
identified problems, but also of  the appropriate means and instruments is crucial 
to determine future opportunities to enhance inter-organizational cooperation.
II.1. UN: Integrated Missions
The UN’s primary and enduring mission since its creation has been to save “suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of  war.”8 As the most active organization 
in the area of  peacekeeping operations (PKO), the UN was hence also the most 
struck by the fundamental changes of  the conditions and character of  PKOs. 
Since the late 1980s, it had to adapt to a paradigm shift in peacekeeping from 
traditional monitoring of  ceasefires and patrolling buffer zones towards highly 
complex scenarios often characterized by inter-state, ethnic or tribal conflicts, and 
civil wars that frequently resulted in disorder, social-economic depression and 
failed states.
This new environment required the tasks of  UN engagement to be broadened. A 
growing number of  UN PKOs have become multidimensional, that is, composed 
of  a range of  components including military, police, political, civil affairs, rule of  
law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender.9
This increased on the one hand the demand of  personnel and expertise. On the 
other, the expanding set of  tasks also increased the complexity of  missions, both 
internally and externally. This growing number of  UN PKOs has forced mem-
ber states as well as the UN General Secretariat to recognize the need to develop 
a “comprehensive doctrine that better defines what modern UN peacekeeping 
operations have become.”10
Today, the UN constitutes both conceptually and by practical experience the most 
advanced international organization regarding the development of  comprehensive 
approaches. The notion of  “Integrated Missions,” introduced in 200 and recently 
substantiated with the so-called Capstone Doctrine, aims at improving the co-
8 Preamble of  the UN Charter.
9 Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Depart-
ment of  Peacekeeping Operations United Nations, 2003, p. 1.
10 Salman Ahmed, Paul Keating, Ugo Solina, Shaping the future of  UN peace operations: is there a doctrine in the house?, 
in: Cambridge Review of  International Affairs, March 2007, pp. 11–28, here p. 12.
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herence of  the UN system in peacekeeping operations and to bundle all military, 
political, development aid related, and humanitarian activities.11
The UN’s adaptation efforts have culminated in the Integrated Missions (IM) 
concept. IM refers to a specific type of  operational process and design, where the 
planning and coordination processes of  the different elements of  the UN units 
are integrated into a single country-level UN system when it undertakes complex 
peace building missions. The IM concept has been established as the guiding prin-
ciple for future post-conflict complex operations by the 2006 note of  the Secre-
tary-General on Integrated Missions.12
This concept has been an initiative which aims to achieve system-wide coherence 
across the UN. Coherence can be defined as the “effort to direct the wide range 
of  activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, 
rule of  law and security dimensions of  a peace building system towards common 
strategic objectives.”13 With coherence comes coordination; the “systematic utiliza-
tion of  policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and 
effective manner.”14
The overall aim of  the IM is to create a balance between the need for a security re-
sponse and the necessity to ensure that all perspectives of  developmental, human 
rights and gender issues are taken into account.15 By applying such an integrated 
process, the UN seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging 
from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually sup-
portive manner. Eventually, an IM relies on a common vision of  the strategic goal 
at the specific country level, shared by all UN actors.
Today, the UN encompasses a high number of  multidimensional peacekeeping 
operations where it seeks to take this integrated approach into effect, for example 
in DR Congo. However, given the recent development of  the IM concept, it did 
not have much time to considerably impact on the UN structure and missions. 
It mainly influenced concepts like the standards for DDR and the consolidated 
peace strategies and compacts. One of  its main achievements so far was prob-
ably to carry on the reform of  authorities in operations, e. g. the position of  the 
11 Department of  Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping operations: Principles and guidelines, January 
2008, p. 5 (Capstone Doctrine).
12 Note of  Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General, 9 December 2005; see also the Revised 
Note of  Guidance on Integrated Missions, 17 January 200.
13 Coning (note 3), p. 7.
14 Coning, ibid.
15 Coning, op. cit, p. 15.
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“Special Representatives to the Secretary General” (SRSG). The person is now the 
Senior UN Representative in the country having authorities over all UN activities. 
The SRSG has to ensure that all UN components in the country aim to pursue 
a coordinated and coherent approach. The success of  this step lies less in the 
systematic development of  strategies and priorities than in the ability to manage 
and balance the contradictions and tensions among the UN elements as well as the 
overall mandate.1
The UN’s difficulties in implementing those concepts result from the size of  the 
UN, the parallel structure of  its subordinate and specialized organizations, and the 
concomitant limits of  its effective control. In the field of  crisis management, the 
“Department for Political Affairs” and the “Department for Peacekeeping Op-
erations” rival over the overall control of  operations. Furthermore, considerable 
differences exist in the way problems are perceived and resolved by the various 
respective UN actors. This results in debilitating frictions as well as horizontal and 
vertical conflicts over jurisdiction. Eventually, this confusion grows when it comes 
to the distribution of  responsibilities for coordination and the level of  author-
ity individual units are equipped with and placed within the structure of  a local 
mission.
II.2. EU: Civil-Military Cooperation
Like the UN, the EU also disposes of  a broad range of  civilian and military instru-
ments for crisis management. The core challenge for the EU consists in assuring 
coherence on the one hand between the instruments of  the EU Commission (first 
pillar) and those of  European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, second pillar), 
and between civilian and military instruments within ESDP itself  on the other 
hand.
To this end, the EU has developed the concept of  Civil-Military Co-ordination 
(CMCO). It is the hallmark of  doctrinal development and seeks to ensure and 
guide a Comprehensive Approach particularly at the political-strategic level, rang-
ing from the planning phase to the execution of  a mission. Accordingly, in the 
context of  CFSP/ESDP, CMCO aims to address “the need for effective coordina-
tion of  the actions of  all relevant EU actors.”17
1 Susanna P. Campbell, Anja T. Kaspersen, The UN’s Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers, in: International Peace-
keeping, no. 4/2008, pp. 40–48, here pp. 4–42.
17 Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO), EU Document 44/03, November 2003, p. 2.
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The “Crisis Management Procedures”18 as well as the “Crisis Management Con-
cept,” which is developed individually for each operation, are geared towards en-
suring that the Comprehensive Approach is applied in the EU’s crisis management 
activities. As a practical example, “EU Special Representatives,” who are based in 
the field, increasingly play the role of  a coordination hub for EU mission activities, 
thereby linking both Brussels and the field level, and the different agencies in the 
field.19 Besides, the EU constantly attempts to increase the common understand-
ing and organizational culture of  its staff  for example by integrated training of  
personnel. Mission evaluations of  Congo and Bosnia indicate that the EU is able 
to improve its effectiveness and coherence of  comprehensive crisis management 
operations.
However, the Union has so far been unable to make full use of  its potential for 
integrated civil-military operations. The inter-institutional cooperation deficits 
resulting from the EU’s pillar construction can be potentially improved by the 
stipulations of  the EU reform treaty, which is, however, currently blocked. The 
treaty would have addressed such issues as funding of  civilian and military opera-
tions, or an integrated staff  of  the Council and the Commission lead by a newly 
established “High Representative of  the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy.”20 However, the implementation of  these suggestions for improvement as 
well as the full use of  the already existing civil-military planning cell and the opera-
tions center for integrated civil-military ESDP operations are repeatedly prevented 
by member states who cling to their particular (national) interests.21
II.3. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach
Stating that the geographical location of  threats is no longer of  importance, 
NATO has identified threats to international security on a global scale. With 
threats “getting global,” old security paradigms that roamed during the Cold War 
have been swapped with an “engagement paradigm.”22 This shift from deterrence 
to engagement requires NATO to address security challenges at their source, in 
other words, to view security functionally, rather than geographically.
18 Council of  the EU, Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, Doc. 2/03, 
2003.
19 Giovanni Grevi, Pioneering foreign policy: The EU Special Representatives (Chaillot Paper no. 10), Paris, October 
2007.
20 Christian Mölling: ESDP After Lisbon: More Coherent and Capable? (CSS Analyses in Security Policy, Center for Secu-
rity Studies, ETH Zurich, vol. 3, no. 28), Zurich 2008.
21 European Parliament (ed.), The Impact of  the Lisbon Treaty on ESDP—Workshop Summary, Brussels 2008.
22 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the IISS Annual Conference, 7th September 2007, via 
<http://www.iiss.org> .
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More palpable lessons have resulted from NATO operations. Since 1992, the Al-
liance has continuously conducted operations. The lessons identified from those 
carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan but also the disaster 
relief  operation in Pakistan (2005) or the support to the African Union in Darfur, 
have underlined the fact that NATO is never alone in the theatre. It has thus to 
ensure effective coordination between a wide spectrum of  actors from the in-
ternational community, both military and civilian, as the essential key to achieve 
sustainable results.
At the 200 Riga Summit, NATO Allies agreed that a comprehensive approach en-
gaging different actors was required to meet the challenges of  operational environ-
ments such as Afghanistan and Kosovo. For NATO, a comprehensive approach 
is a “broader approach to military planning that takes into account all the military 
and civilian aspects of  a NATO engagement through the entire duration of  an op-
eration.”23 It promotes “cooperation and coordination between the international 
organizations, individual agencies and NGOs, as well as the host government.”24
With the acceptance of  the “Comprehensive Political Guidance” at the 200 
Riga Summit, NATO established the CA as its planning blueprint. This is to be 
achieved by expanding its approach for military planning to include all civilian and 
military aspects of  a NATO engagement. Due to the fact that NATO itself  has 
no relevant civilian capabilities, its approach primarily seeks to improve the exter-
nal cooperation with civilian actors and other international organizations.
The Riga decisions build upon earlier doctrinal considerations, above all NATO’s 
first doctrine of  civil-military cooperation—CIMIC25—which was officially estab-
lished in 2002. CIMIC aims to facilitate the “cooperation between a NATO com-
mander and all parts of  the civilian environment with his Joint Operations Area.”2 
More generally, it seeks to provide the interface between civilian and military 
structures for NATO. It emphasizes the importance of  cooperation with national 
and local governments as well as with other IOs and NGOs. However, CIMIC is 
an instrument established only at the field level.
In the field, NATO has made a first and partially successful step towards acting 
with a CA for example by setting up Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 
23 Press Kit, NATO Summit meetings of  Heads of  State and Government Bucharest, Romania, 2–4 April 2008, p. 3. 
24 Keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero at the GLOBSEC Conference, 
17 January 2008.
25 CIMIC is the “coordination and cooperation, in support of  the missions, between the ANT commander and civil actors, 
including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organiza-
tion and agencies” (cf. NATO IMS MC 4/ NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, January 2002). 
2 NATO IMS MC 4/ NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, January 2002. 
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Afghanistan. Currently, 2 PRTs are active on the ground in Afghanistan.27 These 
civil-military units are designed to provide security locally and to facilitate recon-
struction measures. However, both the composition of  the PRTs as well as their 
precise objectives and means diverge considerably. This reflects to some extent the 
PRTs adaptation to the specific needs of  the local environment. However, defin-
ing the composition of  PRTs is essentially the prerogative of  the respective lead 
nation and the other participating nations.28 Hence, national or even departmental 
conceptions of  crisis management and particular interests of  domestic actors gain 
direct influence on the effectiveness and feasibility of  NATO’s Comprehensive 
Approach.
However, the Alliance’s basic problem is its reputation as a military actor who is by 
definition less aware of  the civilian dimension of  crisis management. Thus, partic-
ularly among civilian actors, its credibility as a cooperative partner and an advocate 
of  the Comprehensive Approach is rather limited.
The extent to which NATO can revise its crisis management strategy and there-
fore gain acceptance for it will largely depend on the commitment of  US President 
Barack Obama to the transatlantic relationship and the resulting implications for 
the issues of  Kosovo, Afghanistan, and cooperation between the EU and NATO.
Conclusion: Towards Effective and Legitimate Coordination
So far, comprehensive approaches have shown an ambiguous performance. Di-
verging organizational cultures as well as available resources pose structural limits 
for harmonization and enhancing efficiency. Furthermore, systemic changes to 
assure a CA occasionally require large commitments in terms of  transformation 
costs and time, with frictional losses arising from departmental resistance against 
the reallocation of  power and resources. It is hard to overcome institutional self-
interest and to change traditional administrative structures and privileges in the 
name of  abstract concepts such as coherence or efficiency. This persistence of  
traditional patterns and structures further reduces the space for successfully apply-
ing a CA.
However, those challenges that made a CA necessary still linger on. Therefore, and 
as long as the international community perceives crisis management as an ap-
propriate instrument, there is no alternative than to continue pursuing a compre-
27 NATO, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Facts and Figures, 0 June 2008, <http://www.nato.int/ISAF/
docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf>.
28 Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens, Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction 
Team in Afghanistan, in: Armed Forces and Society, no. 34 (2008), pp. 173–20, here p. 179.
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hensive approach. Conversely, to keep on failing to manage complexity of  crisis 
management will further undermine the legitimacy and the effectiveness of  the 
engagement of  the international community in crisis management.
Given the limits of  common crisis management concepts and the reasons there-
fore, the probability of  the Comprehensive Approach to advance from a theoreti-
cal model to a palpable contribution to international security will depend on the 
(re-) balancing of  system-wide and particular interests. Common strategies cannot 
be sustained beyond the security cultures of  the participating actors. This however 
poses a qualitatively different reason than the ones resulting from interministerial 
or other agency rivalries about resources, prestige and individual careers.
Concrete concepts of  CA will always have to manage the tension between effec-
tiveness and political legitimacy. However, this should not lead to hasty abandon-
ing every suggestion to improve effectiveness because of  national or other par-
ticularities. Instead, the question of  the consequences of  continued uncoordinated 
activities of  different actors should be addressed. The accompanied frictions do 
not only imply a waste of  resources but also undermine the legitimacy of  those 
acting unilaterally.
Luís Pereira da Costa (NFC 2008) from the European Commission
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Summary
Rafeh Malik
Stephan Renner divided his paper into three parts. In the first part he explained 
the rationale for political measures in energy efficiency. He then gave a brief  over-
view of  the goals and objectives of  the European Union in energy efficiency. In 
his last part he highlighted the implementation of  the Energy Services Directives 
(ESD) in Europe and methods for monitoring energy efficiency measures.
Renner highlighted that, according to European Commission estimates, the EU’s 
energy consumption is approximately 20% higher than can be justified on eco-
nomic grounds, with energy still being wasted causing negative economic and 
environmental effects. The EU has set itself  a 20-20-20 goal to tackle this chal-
lenge: reducing emissions by 20%, increasing the share of  renewables to 20% and 
improving energy efficiency by 20%. In his conclusion Stephan Renner stressed 
that energy efficiency was a necessary but not sufficient condition to reduce 
energy demand. He further identified the poor implementation of  existing legisla-
tion as the main obstacle to improving energy efficiency in the EU. He assessed 
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that the willingness to invest into energy efficient technologies and energy services 
as well as political strength to develop much more ambitious programs was key to 
reduce EU-wide energy consumption.
In his presentation on the Russian Natural Gas Strategy, Dmitry Udalov elaborat-
ed on the vital links between the European Union and Russia in the energy sector. 
Unfortunately, according to Udalov, the relationship has been characterized by 
prejudices and a lack of  trust on both sides.
In the near future Russia is likely to retain the largest share of  EU energy imports. 
Also, natural gas is going to play a vital role in the European energy mix. Today 
natural gas is one of  the most important sources of  energy, and its importance 
will continue to grow. Russia plays a significant role in the natural gas sector. Firstly, 
it possesses the largest natural gas reserves on the planet, with roughly one third 
of  the total world natural gas reserves. Secondly, Russia’s experience and techno-
logical advancement in geology, natural gas production and transportation make 
it a key player in this field. Thirdly, Russia has gained valuable experience in the 
international energy business, having successfully fulfilled a number of  projects 
with foreign partners.
By describing the interdependence of  Russia and the EU, Dmitry Udalov ex-
plained that while buyers tried to diversify their energy sources, sellers had similar 
diversification attempts with their buyers. In his conclusion, he stated that coop-
eration on natural gas between the EU and Russia in the coming years will largely 
depend on Russia’s willingness and the EU’s ability to provide financial resources 
and technical skills for upstream development in the context of  long term agree-
ments covering both volumes and pricing.
The ensuing discussion covered questions regarding ways and incentives to engage 
the United States, consumers and businesses in energy efficiency as well as aspects 
of  energy security as a factor in foreign policy and geo-political strategies.
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The Most Important Piece in Solving the Energy Puzzle: 
Increasing Energy Savings and Energy Efficiency in the 
European Union
Stephan Renner
Introduction
The European Commission estimates that the Union’s energy consumption is ap-
proximately 20% higher than can be justified on economic grounds. That is to say 
that energy is still wasted with negative economic as well as environmental effects. 
In its Second Strategic Energy Review published on 13 November 2008 the Euro-
pean Commission not only highlights the economic impact, but argues that energy 
efficiency and energy savings are the key for securing the European Union’s 
energy supply. The Second Strategic Energy Review reconfirms the EU's 20-20-20 
by 2020 goals and makes proposals for reaching them. In terms of  energy ef-
ficiency the goal is to reduce primary energy consumption by 20% compared to 
projections for 2020. Moreover, energy efficiency is treated as part of  the broader 
issue of  energy security.
Already in 200, the European Council and the Parliament adopted a Directive on 
the promotion of  end-use efficiency and energy services to enhance the cost-ef-
fective and efficient end-use of  energy in Member States. The goal of  the so-
called Energy Services Directive (ESD) is to achieve an overall national indicative 
energy savings target of  9% for the ninth year of  application of  the Directive and 
thus increase energy efficiency.
The Commission argues that current energy efficiency legislation alone will not 
deliver sufficient energy savings to meet the 20% saving objective. In order to 
improve energy efficiency in the EU and effectively reduce its final energy con-
sumption additional efforts are needed. Moreover, one of  the main obstacles for 
the Commission to energy efficiency improvements is the poor implementation of  
the existing legislation. However, the ESD is an important first step for improving 
energy efficiency in the European Union.
The goal of  this paper is therefore to provide an informed input to a discussion 
about the possibilities and obstacles of  energy efficiency policies in the European 
Union. While the case of  the ESD will be presented in more detail, the discus-
sion should focus on the ambiguities of  the policies that have been adopted so far. 
The paper is divided into three parts: In the first part I will explain the rationale 
Stephan Rennerr
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for political measures in energy efficiency. I will then give a brief  overview of  the 
goals and objectives of  the EU in terms of  energy efficiency. In the last part I will 
eventually highlight the implementation of  the ESD in Europe and the methods 
that will be used in monitoring energy efficiency measures.
The rationale for energy efficiency
Meeting the energy demand is the basic requirement of  energy security. The level 
of  future demand is influenced by a range of  different factors, including energy 
prices, income and lifestyle decisions. The impact of  demand-side developments 
is measured by the evolution of  energy intensity, which refers to the quantity of  
energy necessary to produce one unit of  GDP.
Rationale for energy efficiency
In the Second Strategic Energy Review the European Commission argues that the 
direct benefits of  energy savings, provided the 20% energy reduction objective is 
met in 2020, are expected to be EUR 220 billion per year.1 However, the indirect 
economic benefits are estimated to be much higher. “Energy and its use affect us 
all. Energy efficiency combats climate change, improves energy security, contrib-
utes to the attainment of  the Lisbon goals, and reduces costs for all EU citizens.”2 
The Commission’s arguments for more energy efficiency are therefore:
– less CO2 emissions and a positive effect on the fight against climate change;
– industry, service sector and private households have lower energy bills;
– less dependency on gas and oil imported from abroad – at present, the EU 
imports more than 50% of  its energy from third countries;
– lowering the impact of  volatile oil prices on the EU;
– creation of  jobs: the provision of  specific services promoting energy efficient 
behaviour and the development and sale of  energy efficient products (sun 
collectors, insulation material, compact fluorescent light bulbs etc.) constitute 
a new growing and profitable market.
Energy efficiency is the most cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. In many cases, investments in energy productivity are feasible with existing 
technical means. Investments in energy productivity thereby reduce the need to ex-
pand energy supply. The IEA estimates that, on average, an additional Euro spent 
on more efficient electrical equipment, appliances, and buildings avoids more than 
two Euros in investment in electricity supply. “Energy efficiency is the cheapest 
form of  new energy we have,” Chevron CEO David O’Reilly pointed out recently. 
 Calculated savings are 390 Mtoe; at $ 96/barrel net of  taxes this equals EUR 220 billion. 
2 Memo 08/699, European Commission, 3 November 2008, Brussels. 
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In addition, European businesses can benefit by innovating and creating new 
products and markets for energy-efficient products and solution.3
Moreover, energy efficiency also has a social implication. The waste of  energy 
through inefficient buildings and appliances particularly hurts the poor. In the UK, 
average domestic duel fuel bills (Gas & Electricity) have increased from £ 572 to 
£ 1,287 (+125%) between January 2003 and September 2008. The Fuel Poverty 
Advisory Group estimates that some 4 million households in England were in a 
state of  fuel poverty in September 2008. Investments in energy efficiency reduce 
the individual energy consumption and thus always have a social impact, too. 
While it is the subject of  academic debate if  energy efficiency will reduce energy 
consumption at the macro level, this definitely is the case for a single household. 
If  energy consumption is reduced successfully a household with lower income will 
be proportionately more positively affected than a household with higher income.
Europe’s current energy situation
Average Europeans consume energy for their iPods and MacBooks, for heating and 
washing, for travelling to meetings, visiting friends or switching on the light when 
being back home. Energy is a means to lead a certain lifestyle and to reach certain 
destinations. It is this demand for energy that mainly drives the energy sector.
3 McKinsey Global Institute (2008), Capturing the European energy productivity opportunity, San Francisco.
Participants of the panel on energy security
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The energy consumption is rising in the EU as well as in important developing 
countries. As can be seen in Figure , the final energy consumption is rising in 
both the USA and the EU. On top of  that, China has seen a dramatic increase in 
its final energy consumption since 2000.
Figure 1: Final energy consumption in ktoe
Source: ENERDATA
In the Second Strategic Energy Review the European Commission estimates that 
the EU’s consumption will rise between 5% and 9% until 2020 depending on the 
development of  the oil price. Gross inland consumption in 2020 would reach a 
level between 1.900 and 1.970 Mtoe. However, even in the baseline scenario that 
includes current trends and policies implemented in the Member States up to the 
end of  200, energy intensity will improve until 2020. That is to say that there 
will be less energy consumption per GDP in 2020 than today. Still, since the goal 
is to reach a sound annual GDP growth, unless bold policies are implemented 
soon, more energy will be needed in absolute terms in 2020 than today with all the 
related consequences on import dependency, GHG emissions and the fuel for the 
poor parts of  the population.
4 “ktoe” is the abbreviation for “kilo ton of  oil equivalent,” “mtoe” stands for “mega ton of  oil equivalent.”
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Figure 2: Energy intensity of GDP at purchasing power parities
Source: ENERDATA
Energy intensity differs dramatically between the different countries and regions. 
Energy intensity per capita in the USA and Canada is the highest in the world. 
This is highlighted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Figure 3: Final consumption per capita 2007
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An even more explicit conclusion can be drawn from Figure 4. The energy con-
sumption per capita in the USA and Canada is more than twice as high as in Eu-
rope and almost seven times higher than in China. There is an enormous potential 
for energy savings in North America that has not been exhausted so far. Moreover, 
the European Union, too, can become much more energy efficient if  it uses its 
existing potentials.
Figure : Primary energy consumption in Gigajoule (GJ) per capita in 2005
2.3 Saving Potentials
In the last decade, the EU Member States have improved in energy efficiency. 
According to the Commission, the annual final energy use would have increased 
by  Mtoe or % over the 99–2006 period, had there not been significant 
energy efficiency improvements. This equals one third of  all crude oil imports to 
the EU-2 in 2006. While GDP has more than doubled since the first oil crisis of  
the early 1970s, the total primary energy supply has increased by only 30%. The 
industrial sector reduced its energy intensity by 24% since 1997; transport and 
households have improved by only 9%.5 Still, total energy consumption has been 
constantly growing.
Much more action is therefore needed to actually reduce energy consumption. The 
Commission argues that with current legislation and the proper implementation 
 European Commission (2008) Energy efficiency: delivering the 20% target. Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, 13 
November 2008, Brussels.
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by the Member States, energy savings of  not more than 13% by 2020, relative to 
current projections, can be reached. According to the PRIMES-Scenario used by 
the European commission in its Second Strategic Energy Review, action on energy 
efficiency could deliver efficiency improvements in the range of  34% to 36% by 
2020 depending on the oil price. In the so-called New Energy Policy Scenario the 
absolute gross inland consumption in 2020 will actually decrease.
Figure  illustrates the development of  the final energy demand in 200 and in 
2020 according to four different scenarios.
Figure 5: Final energy demand in Petajoule (PJ) in 2020 for EU-27
Source: European Commission, PRIMES
According to a recent study by the Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation 
Research (ISI), there is an enormous saving potential in the different sectors. In 
the baseline that includes the successes of  recent policies (e. g. building directive, 
labelling, etc.) the final energy demand will increase until 2020. Only in the high 
policy intensity scenario the final energy demand will actually decrease until 2020. 
In a scenario with high policy intensity, i. e. a strong political effort to increase 
energy efficiency, ISI expects the following saving potentials for the year 2020 
(Table 1). As a consequence, more efforts are needed than the current policies to 
 Wolfgang Eichhammer, Study on the Energy Savings Potential in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and EEA 
Countries, Preliminary Results. Presentation at the EU Energy Demand Management Committee Meeting on 30 Octo-
ber 2008 (Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation Research—ISI), Brussels 2008. 
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reduce the final energy demand in the future. The point here is that the demand 
for energy can be reduced, if  concrete political measures are taken.
Table 1: Estimated savig potential in high policy inensity scenario
Industry 10%
Households 28%
Tertiary 23%
Transport 20%
Source: Fraunhofer Institute (ISI).
Current and future EU policies on energy efficiency
There are a number of  legislative acts already in place to improve energy efficiency 
in the EU. Moreover, energy efficiency is an important component and argument 
in the wider discussion on energy security in the EU. The less the EU consumes 
the less dependent it is from external sources of  energy.
In November 2008, the European Commission presented the Second Strategic 
Energy Review with the goal of  supporting the EU’s 20-20-20 goals. The Com-
mission published a range of  different proposals, such as an EU Energy Security 
and Solidarity Action Plan and a package of  energy efficiency proposals aiming 
at energy savings in key areas, such as reinforcing energy efficiency legislation on 
buildings and energy-using products.
The first priority identified in the Second Strategic Review is to adopt and rapidly 
implement the measures in order to reach the European Council’s energy policy 
targets for the EU aiming at a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% 
share for renewables in final energy consumption and a 20% saving in future en-
ergy demand by 2020.
With the adoption of  the so called energy and climate package by the European 
Council and the European Parliament in December 2008, these 20-20-20 goals 
were reinforced and strengthened by concrete measures. However, whereas bind-
ing targets were established for renewables and carbon dioxide, there is still no 
binding target for energy efficiency and energy savings in 2020. The energy and 
climate package contains the following directives, decisions and regulations:
– Directive on the promotion of  the use of  energy from renewable sources
– Directive on a greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system
– Decision on shared efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
– Directive on geological storage of  carbon dioxide
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– Direction on monitoring and reduction of  greenhouse gas emissions from 
fuels (road transport and inland waterway vessels)
– Regulation on emission performance standards for new passenger cars.
What is central in all the directives, though, is that energy efficiency is the key to 
achieving the renewables targets as well as the emission reduction targets. Art. 3 
of  the Directive on the promotion of  the use of  energy from renewable sources 
that was adopted by the European Parliament on December 17, 2008 states that in 
order to reach the mandatory national targets for the use of  energy from renew-
able sources more easily, “each Member State shall promote and encourage energy 
efficiency and energy saving.”
Second Strategic Energy Review
A package of  energy efficiency proposals aims to push energy savings in a num-
ber of  areas, such as reinforcing the energy efficiency legislation on buildings and 
energy-using products, and enhancing the role of  energy performance certificates 
as well as inspection reports for heating and air-conditioning systems. To improve 
efficiency in energy supply, the Commission has adopted guidelines to enable the 
uptake of  electricity generation from highly efficient cogeneration installations. 
For 2009, the Commission plans a thorough evaluation of  the 200 European Ac-
tion Plan for Energy Efficiency.
The European Commission has proposed reinforcing existing efficiency standards 
on buildings and energy-using products as part of  the Second Strategic Energy 
Review package announced on November 13, 2008. The key proposals include 
energy efficiency of  buildings, energy labels and new rules for labeling tires for cars 
and trucks. In addition, the Commission established guidelines on the calculation 
of  electricity from combined heat and power generation (co-generation).7 “Net im-
ports of  fossil fuels are expected to stay at roughly today’s levels in 2020 even when 
EU's climate and energy policies are fully implemented,” the Commission argues 
in a new “action plan” on energy security and solidarity that is part of  the Second 
Strategic Energy Review. The following proposals are related to energy efficiency:
1. Review on the Energy Performance of  Buildings Directive (EBPD)
2. Review on Energy Labelling Directive
3. Review on Ecodesign Directive
4. Review on Cogeneration Directive
5. Benchmarking and best practice
6. Cohesion policy funds for energy efficiency
7 Source: EurActive.com, 14 November 2008.
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7. Review of  Energy Tax Directive in preparation
8. Review of  Energy Efficiency Action Plan in 2009.
The Energy Services Directive (ESD)
For those end-use sectors that are not covered by the Emission Trading Scheme, 
the European Parliament and the Council developed the Directive on energy end-
use efficiency and energy services (Energy Services Directive, ESD).
The goal of  the Directive is to make the end use of  energy more economic and 
efficient by:
– establishing indicative targets, incentives and the institutional, financial and le-
gal frameworks needed to eliminate market barriers and imperfections which 
prevent efficient end use of  energy;
– creating the conditions for the development and promotion of  a market for 
energy services and for the delivery of  energy-saving programmes and other 
measures aimed at improving end-use energy efficiency.
Among other aspects, this includes an indicative energy savings target for the 
Member States in 201, obligations on national public authorities as regards 
energy savings and energy efficient procurement as well as measures to promote 
energy efficiency and energy services.
As with other directives, the ESD needs to be implemented in the Member States. 
Each Member State developed a more or less detailed National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan (NEEAP) and sent it to the European Commission. All other deci-
sions regarding the implementation of  the directive are made in the framework of  
the comitology process in the so called Energy Demand Management Committee 
(EDMC). Here, the Commission initiates decisions on common understandings of  
the different articles of  the ESD.
Moreover, in order to achieve a common way to calculate energy savings result-
ing from energy efficiency measures, the Commission initiates the development 
of  harmonized bottom up and top down methods in its sub-committees. Bottom 
up methods start with energy savings from an individual energy efficiency mea-
sure and add up all the measures to arrive at a figure for energy savings; top down 
methods, on the other hand, use aggregate data and econometric models in their 
calculations. However, since this is a very technical process, it necessarily involves 
many decisions (should all measures or only politically induced measures be 
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relevant? What is included in the baseline definition? How can the energy savings 
target of  9% be interpreted?).
Additionally, all member states need to verify their energy savings and monitor 
the energy efficiency measures taken by the different actors. The Austrian Energy 
Agency is the responsible body for monitoring energy savings measures in Austria. 
The relevant body for all decisions regarding the implementation of  the ESD at 
the federal level, however, is the Ministry of  Economy.
One of  the most controversial issues in that respect is how to include energy com-
panies in the process. The ESD requires Member States (MS) to place obligations 
on energy suppliers to offer and promote energy services, energy audits and/or 
other energy efficiency improvement measures to their customers. Within this re-
quirement there is a great deal of  flexibility as to the exact form of  the obligation 
and the mechanisms for delivery in different fuel sectors, including use of  volun-
tary agreements and white certificates. MS have the option to use either voluntary 
agreements or white certificate systems to implement these requirements and a 
few MS have already introduced white certificate systems or voluntary agreements.
The goal in Austria is to develop voluntary agreements between the interest 
representation of  the energy distributors, distribution system operators and retail 
energy sales companies. However, so far no agreement has been reached between 
the energy companies representatives and the Federal Ministry.
Conclusion
Today it is widely accepted that energy should be used as efficiently as possible for 
a variety of  economic, environmental or social reasons. Energy efficiency is hence 
not a controversial issue. However, problems arise when it comes to concrete ac-
tion both by the member states and stakeholders, most importantly because these 
involve additional investment costs (even when the cost for the entire life cycle of, 
for example, a product are eventually lower).
At the same time, it is contested on both the theoretical as the empirical level, if  
energy efficiency measures actually lead to energy savings at the macro level. Ever 
since the publication of  Stanley Jevons “The Coal Question,” first published in 
185,8 economists have been arguing that energy efficiency at the microeconomic 
level will only lead to a reduction of  energy use at this very level, and actually 
result in an increase in energy use at the national or macroeconomic level. An im-
8 Jevons Stanley, The coal question—can Britain survive?, London 185. 
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provement in efficiency (of  a product) causes the (implicit) price of  that product 
to fall, and hence stimulates consumption. Therefore, the arguments put forward 
by economists have actually been supported by the historical record for most of  
the past century and the current decade. We can, indeed, observe increasing levels 
of  both energy efficiency and energy consumption.9
Thus, energy efficiency does not always lead to energy savings. The drivers for 
energy consumption, such as GDP growth, personal wealth, lifestyle changes, 
mobility, etc. are, up to now, stronger than the savings generated by increased 
energy efficiency. Even if  a thermal insulation in a buildings reduces the energy 
consumption of  this particular building, the fact that more rooms are heated after 
retrofitting the building (the so called rebound effect) and ever more people need 
comparatively more living space due to smaller families will result in a net growing 
energy demand at the macro level.
As a consequence, two messages remain to be stated at the very end of  this paper. 
First, energy efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient condition to reduce energy 
demand. If  energy efficiency measures had not been improved, the final energy 
consumption would have increased more than it actually did. However, the incon-
venient truth is that – still – our lifestyle and our wealth are based on the availabil-
ity of  cheap energy. As long as our lifestyle demands more energy, any efficiency 
gains will simply be used to consume the saved energy for new appliances. While 
this is easily said, changing energy consumption patterns requires drastic measures, 
such as higher energy prices, taxes for energy consuming activities (individual traf-
fic, etc.) and a fading out of  inefficient appliances (light bulbs, household appli-
ances, etc.).
Secondly, while even the European Commission itself  argues that one of  the main 
obstacles for improving energy efficiency is the poor implementation of  existing 
legislation, the measures taken at the European level are still much more effective 
than what we know from most of  the Member States. If  the EU wants to reach 
its 2020 goals, stronger efforts are needed. In many cases (such as in the limits of  
CO2 emissions for cars) the Member States’ only see short term costs for their 
companies without recognising the long term benefits in lower energy consump-
tion and technological innovation. What is needed is to define both a binding sav-
ing target for 2020 and also penalties and costs for missing this target. The price 
for not being energy efficient and not reaching the targets has to be high enough 
to be an incentive for actually changing policies.
9 Horace Herring, Energy efficiency—a critical view, in: Energy, vol. 3/2006, p. 0–20. 
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Even with lower energy prices, energy efficiency is a business case already. At the 
same time, there is a need for political strength and persistence to develop more 
ambitious programmes that actually reduce the total final energy consumption in 
the European Union and thereby contribute to a long-term security of  the EU’s 
energy supply. We do have ideas and instruments at hand. It is about time to 
implement them and overcome the existing obstacles for more energy efficiency 
and less energy consumption. 
Kathrin Brockmann from Germany and Carmen Godeanu from Israel during the opening ceremony 
at EADS headquarters in Berlin
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The Russian Natural Gas Strategy—Fuelling a Common 
European Future
Dmitry Udalov
In the near future Russia is likely to retain the largest share of  the EU’s energy 
imports. It makes this country a unique energy supplier and explains the necessity 
of  a special partnership between the EU and Russia in this field. Still, the ongoing 
energy dialogue requires constant clarification of  the respective roles and duties to 
escape a diametrically opposed interpretation of  the developments in this sector.
A Fabulous Fuel—The Nature of Natural Gas
For certain reasons natural gas is going to play a specifically valuable role in the 
European energy balance as it is the most abundant, comparatively cheap and 
ecologically acceptable non-renewable fuel.
The importance of  natural gas in the world energy business has rapidly evolved 
over the past decades. Out of  a waste product of  oil industry, natural gas has be-
come one of  the most important sources for the development of  our civilization. 
It might seem odd today, but until very recently a dollar invested in an oil field 
returned twice the profits of  a dollar invested in a gas field. Thus most of  the gas 
was either reinjected into the reservoir to extract the remaining oil or, more com-
monly, burned at the wellhead.
The attitude to natural gas started to change in the 1970s when demand for energy 
soared quickly. After the tremendous increase of  the oil price due to the Arab em-
bargo, big industrial oil users were forced to look for alternative fuel, including gas. 
At the same time, the rise of  environmental concerns started to have an impact on 
the minds of  policy makers and eventually made big coal users, mainly electrical 
utilities, switch to natural gas. This development made possible the birth of  a new 
energy era based on natural gas. Oil companies readjusted their strategies of  natu-
ral gas production and the number of  natural gas consumers continued to grow 
while more pipelines were built to transport natural gas via thousands of  miles.
Today, gas is one of  the most important sources of  energy for many communi-
ties around the globe. And there is no doubt that the importance of  natural gas 
will continue to grow. Natural gas is not merely a source of  energy—it is the most 
promising form of  hydrocarbon energy since it results in a comparatively lower 
emission of  carbon dioxide than coal and oil. It is therefore the most promising 
Dmitry Udalov
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non-renewable energy source in order to cope with new challenges of  global eco-
nomic growth and pave the way to sustainable development.
In terms of  global economic development, natural gas plays an exceptional role 
because it satisfies the needs of  the developed and developing world. In developed 
economies, such as the US and the EU, natural gas is one of  the key instruments 
to cope with climate change and provide sustainability. Recently, both the EU and 
the USA have proclaimed ambitious environmental goals.1 The achievement of  
these goals is impossible without the strengthening of  the role of  natural gas as an 
energy source accompanied by a number of  actions to enforce renewable energy 
and energy efficiency.
In the developing world, other aspects of  the natural gas industry might be more 
important. While developing countries still consider economic growth to be more 
important than environmental protection, they are in constant search for cheap 
sources. Thus natural gas, which is cheaper than petroleum, should be used to fuel 
economic growth. Therefore, its key characteristics in terms of  costs, comfort and 
competitiveness seem lucrative to developing countries, while its long term envi-
ronmental aspects continue to benefit the whole planet, at least when compared to 
more “dirty” forms of  fossil fuel.
Abundance of  natural gas is also an advantage. Most analysts believe that while we 
may experience a serious shortage of  oil in 30–50 years, the proved reserves of  
natural gas are enough to satisfy growing supply for at least 150–200 years.2
It is therefore not surprising that, in a broader term, natural gas is considered by 
some scientists a “bridge fuel” to the new energy economy. The point is that the 
whole energy evolution is viewed as a transition from carbon intensive sources of  
energy like coal to sources with less quantities of  carbon. Carbon captures and 
stores hydrogen. Hydrogen in turn is the main source of  energy, which we receive 
in the process of  burning it. Carbon captures hydrogen but results in environmen-
tally problematic emissions in the form of  carbon oxide and carbon dioxide when 
it is being burnt (cf. picture 1).
While the transition from coal to petroleum already enabled energy consum-
ers to use a greater amount of  hydrogen at lower emissions of  CO2 natural gas, 
1 20 20 by 2020—Europe’s climate change opportunity—Communication from the Commission COM(2008) 30; 
Towards a low carbon future—A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (available in all official languages) Com-
munication from the Commission, Com(2007) 0723; Advanced Energy Initiative, US Department of  Energy.
2 Oil Information 2008, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, August 2008; Natural Gas Information 2008, Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, August 2008.
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i. e. methane, includes only one atom of  carbon and four atoms of  hydrogen. It 
makes it a more effi cient source of  energy than coal and petroleum and the most 
environmentally friendly one of  all other hydrocarbons. In the future, pure hydro-
gen will be used for our energy needs. The transfer to a hydrogen economy by a 
massive use of  hydrogen fuel cells in vehicles and industry, which we may witness 
in the forthcoming decades, will in turn require large quantities of  pure hydrogen. 
Natural gas will be the cheapest way to produce hydrogen until there will be more 
sophisticated technological advancements to receive hydrogen from other sources 
like helium and tritium.
Thus, the future of  the natural gas economy looks rather bright. It is reliable, 
effi cient, and a comparatively environmentally friendly source of  energy to fuel 
human development in this century and beyond.
Russian Natural Gas Strategy
Russia plays a particular role in the global natural gas equations for several reasons. 
Firstly, it possesses the largest natural gas reserves on the planet. By the end of  
2007, Russian natural gas reserves amounted to around 50 trillion cubic meters 
which is roughly one third of  the total world natural gas reserves (see graph 1).
Graph 1. World Natural Gas Reserves3
Other major natural gas reserves are concentrated in Iran and Qatar. Next come 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Nigeria, Venezuela 
3 “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil &Gas Journal, Vol. 105, No. 48 (December 24, 2007), pp. 24–25.
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and Algeria—each country with approximately 3% of  world natural gas reserves. 
Considering that Russia is a country endowed with such abundant natural gas re-
sources makes its position in the market especially strong. While for other energy 
producers the main question is where to search for natural resources, for Russia 
the main question is rather when to exploit them. It therefore requires the devel-
opment of  a comprehensive strategy of  natural gas production, domestic con-
sumption and exports.
Secondly, gas fields require huge investments to deliver the gas from the snow 
deserts of  Siberia to the Russian and European markets. This proves another 
characteristic which underlines Russia’s exceptional role in the area of  natural gas. 
Its experience and technological advancement in geology, natural gas production 
and transportation is largely unparalleled. In several decades the country managed 
to find, produce and transport gas in one of  the most dangerous and climatically 
rigorous regions of  the world. Besides, Russia can boast of  the largest main gas 
pipeline network in the world, which is over 158,000 km long. Occasionally, this 
huge transmission system might be viewed as an Achilles heel of  Russian gas 
industry due to its age and the necessity of  massive investments in repairing works 
and maintenance. Yet, the number of  technical failures in the gas transmission 
system per 1,000 km of  pipeline has actually decreased from 0.21 in 2001 to 0.11 
in 2007.4
Having invested enormous financial, technical and human resources, Russia has 
thus become one of  the major producers and exporters of  natural gas. The figures 
provided in the second graph prove Russia’s ability to play the role of  a sustainable 
supplier of  natural gas.
Since 2001 the Russian natural gas production is growing rapidly alongside its 
export share. A small slowdown in 2007 was due to the unconventionally warm 
winter of  2006–200 which caused a significant decrease of  consumption in 
Russia and Europe. For 2008 and 2009 further growth in production is expected. 
Future production depends on the speed with which Russia develops new gas 
fields to replace the decline of  its giant gas fields such as Medvezhiye. The most 
recent development was realized with the implementation of  two huge long-term 
production projects on Zapolyarnoye field in 200, and on Yujno Russkoye field 
in 200. Other super giant fields in the Yamal peninsula are scheduled to come 
into operation in the upcoming decade. The Shtokman offshore project is an addi-
tional potential source for continuing the success story of  the Russian natural gas 
industry. This project requires significant international cooperation and know-how 
4 Газпром в вопросах и ответах, Moscow 2008.
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for its implementation. That is why on February 21, 2008 Gazprom, Total and 
StatoilHydro established a joint venture to develop this long-term project which is 
of  pan-European interest.
Graph 2: Natural Gas Production and Exports (bcm)
Thirdly, Russia has been gaining valuable experience in the international energy 
business over the last decade by successfully fulfilling a number of  projects to-
gether with its foreign partners. Today, Russian energy companies are operating 
beyond the domestic market and are increasingly integrated in the global energy 
business.
Yet, there are a number of  problems in the Russian domestic natural gas industry 
which should be taken into account to understand the rationale of  the Russian 
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energy strategy. In most cases foreign press coverage is distorted and problems are 
narrowly viewed as the drawbacks of  Russian energy industry which undermines 
Russia’s role as a reliable energy partner. A broader and comprehensive analysis 
shows that those challenges actually represent big opportunities both for Euro-
pean investors and Russia itself.
The first serious problem of  the Russian energy sector is the level of  energy ef-
ficiency, which is far lower than in the European Union and the United States. 
Table  depicts the figures of  energy intensity, i. e. the total primary energy con-
sumption per dollar of  Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Table 1: Energy Intensity 
Total Primary Energy Consumption per Dollar of Gross Domestic Product5
2003 2004 2005
Russia 1.323 15.98 14.935
US 9.534 9.37 9.113
Sweden 8.877 9.089 9.09
Germany 7.198 7.238 7.021
UK .28 .140 .048
Ireland 5.055 5.021 4.919
World total 8.188 8.152 8.035
As we can see, energy consumption per unit of  GDP in Russia is almost twice as 
high as the average level in developed countries. Although we see a gradual decline 
in energy intensity, it is evident that much is to be done to reach the same degree 
as in Europe and North America. To achieve this aim, one has to realize that 
Russia is burning more energy per dollar of  GDP than other developed countries 
not only because of  its cold climate but mainly because of  structural problems 
in energy consumption. Decades of  cheap domestic sources of  energy including 
natural gas halted the development and implementation of  energy saving tech-
nologies. Heat and electricity losses are tremendously high. To address this prob-
lem, the Russian government has developed a strategy which, besides other factors, 
includes a gradual increase of  natural gas prices for the electricity generating sector 
and big industrial consumers. In 2003, the Russian government committed itself  
to raising domestic prices to world market levels by 2011. These measures should 
stimulate Russian energy consumers to use more energy efficient technologies. 
Thereby, it opens a huge market for European innovative technologies which may 
be exported to Russia.
5 International Energy Annual 200, EIA, 2007.
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Independent natural gas production is another issue in the Russian gas industry. 
Besides Gazprom and NOVATEK, Russian oil companies might become other 
important economic players in national natural gas production. Until the new 
legislation was adopted in 2008, it was unprofitable for competitors of  Gazprom 
and NOVATEK to produce natural gas since they had limited opportunities to 
sell and distribute it. A new legislation as well as the gradual increase in domestic 
natural gas prices will permit those companies to get to the market greater quanti-
ties of  natural gas which they produce. Thus, the overall analysis of  future natural 
gas production should also include possible additions by non-traditional natural 
gas producers.
The lack of  a domestic natural gas infrastructure is a paradoxical issue for 
Russia in its position as a major natural gas producer. In Soviet times emphasis 
was given to the construction of  a gas distribution network in Ukraine, Belarus 
and the Baltic states in order to fuel their heavy industry and agricultural sector, 
while the domestic Russian network was dominated by main gas pipelines and a 
lack of  distribution networks. Eastern regions of  Russia were almost left behind in 
terms of  natural gas use. Aware of  the importance of  natural gas for commercial, 
industrial and residential needs, the Russian government is currently implementing 
a strategy of  gasification for Russian regions. It is actually one of  the major goals 
of  Gazprom. The program has already provided gas to some additional 13 million 
Russian citizens in 58 Russian regions in the period from 2005 to 2007. During 
this time, the average “gasification” level as a share of  the population with access 
to gas in the country went up from 54% to 2%.
Growth in domestic consumption will be inevitable as a result of  the two fac-
tors mentioned above. On the one hand, it will be driven by the general economic 
growth plus the increase of  Russian domestic consumption due to the extension 
of  its domestic network. Secondly, as Russian domestic prices for natural gas are 
increasing, the domestic gas market will be nearly as profitable for Russian natural 
gas producers than their existing export contracts. Thus, the popular public belief  
that Gazprom’s key goal is to control the European market may seem unfounded 
since the company will have enough customers both at home and abroad in the 
long run. On the contrary, European partners should now start about the perspec-
tives of  the domestic Russian gas market and possible cooperation projects in this 
respect. This dimension implies the possibilities of  exchange of  assets in distribu-
tion between Russian and European companies.
 Росстат, <http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B08_/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/4-0.htm>.
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The “Geopolitics” of Natural Gas
From time to time, the natural gas industry is viewed as a factor of  highest strate-
gic importance. Supporters of  this argument do not take into account that energy 
is simply one of  a number of  goods which is to be bought and sold on the market, 
according to market rules.
Yet, from a geopolitical point of  view, Europe eventually needs predictability in 
respect of  its gas imports. Predictable and transparent investment programs for 
export-oriented production may be based only on mutual trust and this mutual 
trust is subject to tests when one of  the two sides is trying to use geopolitical argu-
ments for the sake of  market principles. To escape this vicious circle of  mistrust, 
both sides need to understand their importance for one another.
In 2007, the EU relied on Russia to provide 121.43 bcm of  a total EU demand 
of  489.7 bcm, out of  which 290.0 bcm were net gas imports. Thus Russian gas 
amounted to 24.1% of  total consumption and 41.7% of  net imports.7 EU of-
ficials currently assume that the EU will need between  and 2 bcm a year in 
new imports between 2008 and 2020. This is largely because domestic production 
is expected to fall to around 130 bcm a year, with the shortfall being made up by 
imports from a variety of  countries.
Besides Russia, continental Europe's major pipeline natural gas suppliers are the 
Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and Algeria. The EU has outlined a number of  vital 
projects to meet the growing demand for natural gas. This plan—in a framework 
of  TEN-E projects8—incorporates projects worth more than 8 billion Euros of  
investments in new natural gas networks. Among those projects are: ) the North 
European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), 2) the Yamal–Europe Gas Pipeline, 3) a Natural 
Gas Pipeline linking Denmark, Germany and Sweden (Baltic Gas Interconnector), 
4) an increase in the transmission capacity along the Germany–Belgium–United 
Kingdom axis, 5) an Algeria–Tunisia–Italy (Sicily) gas pipeline (TransMed), ) 
an Algeria–Italy gas pipeline, via Sardinia and Corsica, with a branch to France 
(GALSI), 7) the Medgaz gas pipeline (Algeria–Spain–France–Continental Europe), 
8) a Turkey–Greece–Italy gas pipeline (TGI), 9) a Turkey–Austria gas pipeline 
(Nabucco), 10) a Lybia–Italy gas pipeline (Greenstream). The implementation 
of  all those projects along with plans to build more LNG terminals will provide 
Europe with sufficient energy resources.9
7 International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Monthly, 2008.
8 TEN-E is the abbreviation for Trans-European-Network for Energy.
9 MEMO/06/304. TEN-E Guidelines specify a European-wide energy transmission network, Brussels, 24 July 2006.
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The analysis of  TEN-E projects shows that there is actually no geopolitical com-
petition among the various transport projects since the European costumers will 
need gas from all of  the mentioned projects and that is why the EU provides sup-
port to its all major energy partners.
One of  the most debated proposals is the Nabucco pipeline, which has been men-
tioned in the list of  TEN-E projects. It is the construction of  a pipeline from the 
Caspian Sea region to Western Europe bypassing Russia and linking Turkey and 
Austria. This project is portrayed as the major tool to limit Russian influence in the 
European gas market and provide for Europe’s independence in gas imports. Al-
legedly, Russia is viewed as the main hurdle to the implementation of  this project 
and many of  the delays of  the Nabucco project are associated with the Kremlin’s 
role. This is, however, a very simplified and biased view. Each multibillion natu-
ral gas project, be it a pipeline project or an LNG project, is based primarily on 
natural gas resources, which are to be sufficient enough to attract investors. So 
far, the Nabucco project has experienced some drawbacks in terms of  the natural 
gas resources which it is supposed to be transporting to the EU. There were many 
claims to transport natural gas from Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakh-
stan, but no final decision has so far been taken.
Moreover, all the disputes around Nabucco vs. Russian gas seem odd when one 
fact is taken into account, namely that all of  the Russian natural gas is actually 
exported westwards. This point seems quite obvious since the EU is the world’s 
biggest importer and second biggest consumer in the world which also pays some 
of  the world’s highest prices for imported gas. Therefore, Russia will continue to 
be interested in the European market.
In general, one important argument should be made concerning the prevailing as-
sessment of  transport projects for the sake of  production and exploration. While 
there are many talks about transport projects and competition among countries 
in Eurasia, there is really a lack of  public attention towards the production and 
exploration. Transport projects cannot be viewed as the only solution for energy 
security since a more comprehensive attitude to the problem should prevail which 
would imply all the production line from the well to burning tip.
Taking the dependence on the pipeline transportation into account when consider-
ing the natural gas trade, traditional market principles might be modified for the 
sake of  political interests. This is the most controversially debated point in natural 
gas issues. Thus, there must be a clear distinction between business and politics. It 
will help to reduce the level of  unpredictability and increase certainty in the devel-
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opment of  future projects, because business interests tend to be better reasoned, 
their feasibility studies better calculated and all kinds of  risks assessed properly.
While potential buyers try to reserve as much natural gas as possible from the 
most diverse set of  providers, the sellers try to diversify their customers as well. 
Trade in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) seems to be a promising option for both, 
sellers and buyers in order to diversify supply and to provide additional sources of  
natural gas in periods of  peak consumption as well as to adjust natural gas trade to 
traditional market principles.
The first Russian investment in LNG industry is associated with the Sakhalin proj-
ects. The first LNG liquefaction plant has already been constructed near Youjno-
Sakhalinsk and the first deliveries to Japan are expected to start in 2009. Besides, 
the Schtokman project is perceived as a way of  building LNG plants to supply 
Russian natural gas to Spain, France and Belgium, as well as to the American 
market.10 Thus, the development of  Russian LNG business will provide additional 
flexibility and market oriented approach in international gas trade.
Unconventional natural gas solutions
Other innovative solution for the future cooperation between Russia and the EU 
is the possibilities of  cap and trade scheme within Russian gas supplies, therefore 
European customers will be receiving natural gas along with its environmental 
benefits. Natural gas produces less emissions than any other fossil fuel, see graph 3.
Natural gas produces almost three times fewer emissions than coal and it is twice 
as “clean” as oil. Taking into account the ambitious goals of  the European envi-
ronmental protection frameworks it is evident that it will be impossible to achieve 
them without rethinking the role of  natural gas and its ecological advantage when 
discussing the share of  fossil fuels for energy consumption. The global economic 
crisis of  2008 and skepticism regarding the European environmental targets open-
ly aired by Poland and Italy in October of  last year has made European decision 
makers rethink the ways of  implementing the environmental agenda with minimal 
economic losses. According to Eurobarometer polls of  200 and 2002, 54% of  
European customers were not prepared to pay more for renewable energy.11 On 
the business side, analysts estimate that any alternative technology can be competi-
tive with fossil fuels only when the price of  oil is higher than $0/bbl.12 Natural 
10 Learning from Russian energy model, in: Industry Updates, 8 September 2008.
11 <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_0_24/2006_0_24_eurobarometer_slide_en.pdf>.
12 Oil Price Plunge Hits Renewable Energy Firms, in: The Oil Daily, October 17, 2008.
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gas with its relatively cheap price and obvious environmental advantage might be 
among one of  the logical solutions for a future European energy agenda.
Graph 3: Emissions per kWh of energy output (g CO2 per kWh)
13
One of  the concrete proposals is to spread the use of  natural gas by using com-
pressed natural gas as fuel for cars. This type of  cheap and ecologically friendly 
fuel is the most effi cient and economically attractive source besides alternative 
bio-fuels. By the way, it has already proven its reliability, safety and effi ciency in 
Latin America. In Argentine and Brazil more than 3 million cars are running on 
compressed natural gas.14 Paradoxically, Europe will have to catch up with those 
countries in terms of  the use of  alternative fuels!
Furthermore, the development of  a hydrogen economy is also impossible without 
reliance on natural gas. At the outset, it will be the only cheap and reliable source 
for producing pure hydrogen to be used in fuel cells. Although it is a matter of  the 
coming decades, the planning of  a new hydrogen infrastructure and other facili-
ties should be started today, including the launch of  some pilot projects, including 
Russian and European scientists.
13 IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion—Emissions per kWh and Electricity and Heat Output, Vol 2007. 
14 Discussion Paper No. 2008-13 TRANSPORT OUTLOOK 2008—FOCUSSING ON CO2 EMISSIONS FROM 
ROAD VEHICLES, Joint Transport Research Centre of  the OECD and the International Transport Forum, May 2008.
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Conclusion
The coming period of  cooperation in the natural gas sector between the EU and 
Russia will largely depend on Europe’s ability to provide financial and techni-
cal skills for upstream development within the context of  long-term agreements 
covering both volumes and pricing. Notwithstanding the scenario for this future 
development, the overall analysis shows that the Russian Natural Gas strategy is 
an eminent part of  European and Global Energy Security. Besides great historical, 
political and cultural ties between the EU and Russia, the existing link which liter-
ally fuels economies across Europe should be viewed as a factor of  cooperation 
rather than disagreement.
Alumni from Slovenia, Palestine, Armenia, Russia and Denmark, and Hungary in DGAP’s Robert 
Bosch Room
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Summary
Eva Strickmann
This panel brought together four experts, who discussed options for coping with 
climate change through four different lenses. Professor Nils Petter Gleditsch start-
ed with an overview of  the security implications of  climate change and analyzed 
the conflict-inducing effects and challenges for security. Mikkel Aarø-Hansen then 
looked at the urban challenge and explained how climate change can actually be 
seized as a chance for cities. Meade Harris discussed strategies for a clean future 
and elaborated on both international efforts and new approaches in the United 
Kingdom. These three presentations were subsequently summarized and discussed 
by Mari Luomi.
Climate Change and Security
While climate change is often described as a major challenge to international 
security, the immediate security effects of  climate change are difficult to iden-
tify. Professor Nils Petter Gleditsch analyzed the number of  armed conflicts and 
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casualties since the end of  the Second World War and tried to discover parallels 
to climate change during the last decades. While he explained that the growth of  
liberal factors such as democracy promotion, membership in international organi-
sations and closer trade cooperation had lowered the number of  armed conflicts, 
he underlined that climate change was heading in the opposite direction: increased 
international cooperation had not prevented climate change from pursuing a nega-
tive trend.
Gleditsch underlined that the physical consequences of  climate change were obvi-
ous (melting of  glaciers and polar ice, sea-level rise, changes in precipitation, more 
natural hazards) and asked, whether climate change would lead to increased insta-
bility and potential for conflict worldwide. He cited UN and US officials, who had 
defined a clear link between climate change and security, e. g. by stating that “Dar-
fur is the first of  many climate wars” (Jan Egeland and Ban Ki-Moon in 200 and 
2008), by defining climate change as an “all-encompassing threat to human health, 
to global food supply and to peace and security” (Kofi Annan 2006) or by seeing 
climate change as a “threat multiplier for instability in volatile regions of  the world 
and as a major national security challenge for the US” (CNA 200). Gleditsch 
pointed to possible social consequences of  climate change like the destruction of  
traditional livelihoods or migration and presented the following two models of  
possible pathways to conflict:
– The rise of  sea-levels can drive human migration, which can lead to conflict 
in host areas.
– An increase in droughts, flooding and hurricanes can (a) trigger migration 
and thus follow the same conflict pattern as above, and / or (b) heighten 
competition over scarce resources and create a new potential for local con-
flict, and / or (c) result in a lower state capacity and strengthen rebel group 
activities.
However, Gleditsch emphasized the following shortcomings in the climate change-
security research: first, articles published by NGOs, think tanks and peer-reviewed 
literature often draw different conclusions. Second, there is little peer-reviewed 
research on the security implications of  climate change. Third, research is often 
limited to single case studies. Fourth, statistical and comparative analyzes have not 
been able to identify a clear association between scarcity of  renewable resources 
and armed conflict. He therefore called for the following priorities: to disaggre-
gate the climate-conflict debate, collect better data on violence and geo-references, 
analyze the interactions between climate change and social, political and economic 
factors and to link models of  climate change to models of  conflict.
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A general conclusion was that there was little evidence to date that armed con-
flict is directly affected by climate change. However, it was suggested that future 
research should increasingly focus on possible links between the two phenomena. 
Moreover, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) should include 
the security implications of  climate change in its Fifth Assessment Report and 
help raising awareness for possible future scenarios.
The Urban Challenge: Climate Change as a Chance for Cities
Mikkel Aaro-Hansen referred to the City of  Copenhagen, hosting the UN Confer-
ence on Climate Change in December 2009 with an expected wide participation 
of  20.000 experts from all over the world. He explained the need for an increased 
focus on the urban challenges and opportunities, as “the world is coming to the 
cities but the cities are also coming to the world.” The cities need to find solu-
tions to climate change and energy security, as 50% of  the world population live in 
urban areas and 75% of  the world’s energy is consumed in cities. Moreover, cities 
are drivers of  the world economy (e. g. Seoul, Shanghai, London), cities compete 
for labour and knowledge while at the same time cooperating internationally and, 
not least important, cities set more ambitious standards and targets than states do. 
Therefore, Hansen emphasized that it is worthwhile focusing on cities since they 
are the main problem but they are also willing to act, in particular within regional 
and global networks.
Prof. Dr. Nils Petter Gleditsch (Norway)
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The City of  Copenhagen has, for instance, been able to reduce CO2 emissions by 
25% between 1990 and 2005, through focusing on renewable energy, a better pub-
lic transport network and a new heating system. Hansen explained that Copenha-
gen is using climate change as a positive branding (“Climate Capital Copenhagen,” 
“Energy City”) and how new targets are currently being formulated, such as a 20% 
further reduction in CO2 emissions between 2003 and 2015. One important point 
was to exchange experience between cities and to strengthen existing networks. 
Moreover, cities need to be recognized and empowered on four different levels: 
(1) government – government; (2) government – city; (3) city – city and (4) United 
Nations – city. Hansen concluded by citing US president-elect Barack Obama: “we 
need to stop seeing cities as the problem but as part of  the solution.”
New Climate Treaties, Technologies and Institutional Innovations: a UK Perspective
Meade Harris presented a paper on strategies for a clean future, which covered 
three different sections: international regulations for climate change, regulation 
efforts in the United Kingdom and an overview of  the successes and failures 
of  clean technologies for renewable power generation in the UK. Meade Harris 
chose this perspective, as it will be the states and the private sector that have to 
implement the treaties to help transition to a low carbon world. To achieve this 
end international and national regulators need to give incentives to the private 
sector. Harris first looked at key institutions, the United Nations, the G8 and the 
European Union, and emphasized the important role of  the EU in face of  leg-
islation. Moreover, the EU has set ambitious targets, with the 2008 EU Climate 
and Energy package and the 2005 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). She then 
introduced the UK’s target to deliver 15% renewable energy by 2020 as part of  the 
EU’s overall goal that 20% of  the EU’s energy will be sourced from renewables. 
The UK is also seeking to strengthen the ETS, with an anticipated emissions re-
duction of  1% by 2020. To reach the scenario of  15% renewable energy, the UK 
is focusing on () onshore / offshore wind and hydropower, (2) biomass for power, 
(3) nuclear power and (4) carbon capture and storage systems. To better link these 
issues, the UK has recently created a new department entirely focusing on Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC). Meade Harris concluded by stating that govern-
ments need to work closer with the private sector and concentrate their efforts on 
companies rather than consumers.
Discussion
Mari Luomi subsequently discussed these presentations and summarized that cli-
mate change has an important impact on the concept of  security, has transformed 
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the role of  cities as environmental actors and confronts public-private relations 
with new challenges.
She then placed the climate change debate in the field of  International Relations 
research, presenting two lines of  IR research on climate change, security-oriented 
research and governance studies.
Moreover, she elaborated on the security perspective of  climate change and gave 
the example of  the Gulf  States. She referred to Nils Petter Gleditsch’s assumption 
that climate change can be a threat-multiplier in volatile regions and underlined 
that the Middle East will suffer from climate change-induced problems such as 
water scarcity, mass migration and rising sea levels. However, she explained that 
awareness and capabilities of  these states to address climate change are very low.
In her concluding remarks, she underlined that the climate change debate should 
not be securitized, as this could (1) divert attention away from climate change 
mitigation, (2) bear the risk that the climate change debate could be dominated by 
security or energy experts, (3) risk that citizens see the provision of  “climate secu-
rity” as a public service and not as a responsibility of  each citizen, and (4) shift the 
efforts to address climate change in multilateral frameworks to a concentration on 
national security issues instead.
During the discussion, participants agreed that efforts to cope with climate change 
should focus on clear targets and wide participation in different and flexible 
frameworks. In this regard, it was considered important to realize that climate 
change can be a chance for cooperation and that it can make cities and countries 
more attractive. The group discussed possible incentives, the need for clear po-
litical levels of  ambition and willingness to act. Moreover, the importance of  an 
exchange of  experience between different actors was underlined. Two further 
crucial questions were how to get commitment from the private sector and how to 
involve citizens in the climate change debate.
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Strategies for a Clean Future: What Role for New Climate 
Treaties, Technologies and Institutional Innovations?
A Perspective from the United Kingdom
Catherine Meade Harris
Current treaties and regulation do not provide clear long term directions for 
power generation companies. As such, private sector development has and will 
continue to develop slowly with costly setbacks. In the long term this may result in 
the failure to achieve ambitious energy targets. This paper is not an academic but 
rather an anecdotal study of  the politics around the energy sector and attempts to 
analyze current regulations and policies for a low carbon economy and sustainable 
future energy supply.
Introduction
The paper is divided into three sections: International regulation, national regula-
tion and finally the successes and failures of  low carbon technologies for clean 
power generation in the UK. The paper also addresses how the current economic 
crisis is affecting the sector. The section on International regulation briefly dis-
cusses the work of  the United Nations (UN), the G8 and the European Union 
(EU) in addressing climate change. The EU as an actor is of  particular interest as 
it is largely responsible for regulating the specific power generating industry that 
the paper takes a closer look at. A large section of  the paper is thus dedicated to 
explaining how the EU regulates through the European Trading Scheme (ETS), 
the Union’s main instrument to achieve the ambitious target of  a 20 percent re-
duction of  carbon emissions from 1990 levels by 2020. The third section focuses 
on the United Kingdom (UK) as a national example of  how industry is being 
affected from both the international and national level. The paper attempts to as-
sess the success and failures of  four low carbon technologies: carbon capture and 
storage, wind, biomass and nuclear power for power generation in the UK. Finally, 
it will put forward suggestions as to how the transition to a low carbon world can 
be achieved.
International Regulation
The three key International Institutions engaged in climate negotiations that will 
be addressed in this paper are the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the G8 and the European Union (EU). The G8 
countries postulated that they, together with the leading developing nations such 
as China and India, would »consider and adopt« cutting carbon emissions by 50 
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percent by 2050. Yet, their latest meeting in July 2008 gave no baseline date from 
when the cuts in greenhouse gases would be calculated, nor did it commit to an in-
terim reduction en route to the 2050 goal. As there are no binding targets created 
at the G8 summits the impact on the industrial sector is rather limited.1
Securing a global framework agreement for the post-202 period, when the first 
set of  targets under the Kyoto Protocol expires, is crucial to achieving climate 
protection goals. At the UN Bali Climate Change Conference in December 2007, 
an agreement was reached to launch negotiations for a global and comprehensive 
agreement, to be concluded in 2009 at the UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen.2
This agreement looks like it may be much harder to achieve than once expected 
due to the global economic slowdown. The UN climate change negotiations that 
took place in Poznan in early December 2008 did not result in any agreements 
on emissions reduction commitments from key participating parties, leaving the 
most difficult points to be resolved in contentious negotiations in Copenhagen. 
However, simultaneously to the closing talks in Poznan, European heads of  state 
and government convened for a two-day summit in Brussels, where a compromise 
on the EU’s climate and energy package was achieved following difficult negotia-
tions. However, significant concessions were made to the energy-intensive industry 
and Eastern European member states. The decisions, to be turned into law by the 
European parliament later that week, are an important example of  how legisla-
tion can impact industry’s behavior. Rather than treaties or agreements at the UN 
and G8 level, legislation is the key driver for private sector change. Therefore 
this paper focuses primarily on the EU and its ability to regulate the industry and 
businesses.
The driving vehicle with which the EU regulates the power sector is its climate and 
energy package, which sets to achieve a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions 
of  20 percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, increasing to up to 30 percent in 
the event of  an international agreement on climate change. However, the compro-
mises made to the energy-intensive industry now make it unlikely that the EU will 
be able to achieve these targets. One of  the key instruments of  the climate and 
energy package is the Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which was intro-
duced in 2005 and has two fundamental components: a cap on emissions and a 
 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan (MOFA), Declaration of  Leaders Meeting of  Major Economies on Energy Secu-
rity and Climate Change, 9--2008, <http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/g8_toyako_ 
declaration_energy_security_climate_change.pdf>.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), The United Nations Climate Change Confer-
ence in Bali, -2-200, <http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_ 3/items/4049.php>..
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system for trading the “right to emit.” The ETS cap sets a regulatory limit on the 
total emissions from the power sector and other large emitting industries across 
Europe. Some 11,000 installations across the EU are required to operate within 
this cap. The ETS scheme implements an overall cap on the amount of  emis-
sions countries can produce, allocates carbon allowances to companies and then 
allows them to buy or sell the permits to cover shortfalls or profit from cutting 
their emissions. In the negotiations at the EU summit in December 2008, Poland, 
which was the largest critic of  the original plan, managed to negotiate a provision 
for Eastern European power plants to buy only 30 percent of  permits at auction 
in 2013, rising to 100 percent by 2020 (as opposed to full auctioning for all coun-
tries by 2013). Power generators in other EU member states, like the UK, will be 
required to purchase all permits at auction in 2013.3 The power generation sector 
is the first sector to be affected by the package and it will have to undergo drastic 
structural change to sustain competitiveness.
National Regulation in the UK
While it is essential for successful climate protection to negotiate a global treaty 
on emissions, it first has to be assessed at a national level how the requirements 
stemming from the regulation put in place by the EU can actually be achieved. 
The paper therefore looks at ways in which the UK government has implemented 
3 The European Union Website (EU), Climate Action - Energy for a Changing world, <http://ec.europa.
eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_0_climate_change_en.htm>
Catherine Meade Harris (USA), Mikkel Aarø-Hansen (Denmark), and Mari Luomi (Finland)
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certain polices in order to hit the 20/20/20 targets. In the recent past, the UK 
has created a new department entirely focused on Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC), a reorganization that for the first time inexorably links these two key is-
sues. It also passed the UK Climate Change Act in November 2008, which sets the 
government binding targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Act estab-
lishes a new independent expert body, the Committee on Climate Change. The 
Committee’s role is to advise government on its “carbon budget” and on oppor-
tunities for reduction in different sectors. On December 1, 2009, the Committee 
on Climate Change submitted its inaugural recommendations to the government. 
This first report urges the UK to commit to a 34 percent reduction of  GHG 
emissions on 1990 levels by 2020, and a 42 percent reduction if  a global deal is 
achieved. Both of  these creations represent major steps for the government and 
illustrate that British officials are not only taking the targets for 2020 seriously, but 
are also placing the same value on climate change as they have previously placed 
on energy security.
However, progress within the power generation sector has been slow, in part 
because the UK has not implemented feed-in tariffs for renewables like those used 
in many other European countries. The key mechanism for delivering growth has 
been the Renewables Obligation Certificates(ROC), which distribute payments 
from power generators that fail to meet renewable energy targets to companies 
that comply. According to the DECC, the Act will implement the legislative 
aspects of  the 2007 Energy White Paper. It will update the legislative framework 
by (1) putting in place key legislation on Carbon Capture and Storage, (2) creating 
a regulatory framework to enable private sector investment in CCS projects, (3) 
strengthening the Renewables Obligation to drive greater and more rapid deploy-
ment of  renewables and (4) by addressing feed-in tariffs to enable the Govern-
ment to introduce a scheme to financially support low carbon generation of  
electricity in projects up to  MW.4
To date, the main focus for the UK’s low carbon energy policy to reduce GHG 
has been placed on the electricity sector. The UK faces an enormous challenge to 
transition to a low carbon economy and to hit their target for 2020, as the elec-
tricity generation sector currently accounts for about one third of  the UK’s total 
carbon emissions (36 percent from gas-fired power stations, 3 percent from coal, 
18 percent from nuclear, 4 percent from renewables).5
4 Department of  Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Energy Act 2008, 26--2008, UK; <http://www.decc.gov.
uk/en/content/cms/legislation/cc_act_08/cc_act_08.aspx>.
5 Department of  Energy and Climate Change (DECC), The Energy White Paper 2007: ‘Meeting the energy challenge,’ 
UK, <http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/publications/white_paper_0/white_paper_0.aspx>..
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What will drive the change in the UK? One main driver will be ETS, as there have 
only been large-scale changes benefiting renewables within the power generation 
sector as UK companies realized that they were to lose 30 percent of  their free 
carbon allowances. The UK government has led the game in Europe with the first 
auction and hopes that based on this success it will function as a model for other 
European countries. Since the first auction of  carbon dioxide permits netted the 
government £54 million ($80.9 million) in early November 2008, almost 4 mil-
lion permits were sold in an auction that was four times over-subscribed, despite 
the fact that the price of  emission allowances has plunged by nearly 30 percent 
since September to around €6.0, partly because there are fears that the auction 
will flood the market and partly because a recession will cut industrial output and 
reduce pollution worldwide. The government has pledged to auction another 80 
million permits in the next four years, which is likely to bring in revenues of  more 
than £1 billion. While the bidders’ identities were not disclosed, electricity produc-
ers were expected to be the main buyers as they had their free allocation of  permits 
cut by 30 percent. The free allocation of  permits in the first phase of  the scheme, 
from 2005 to 2008, enabled power companies in the UK and other countries to 
make windfall profits by raising electricity prices to cover the notional cost of  hav-
ing to buy permits, despite receiving them free. How can the UK’s power genera-
tion sector transition to a low-carbon one? What is needed are specific long term 
strategies with government subsidies guiding investment for power companies.
Low Carbon Technologies for Clean Power Generation
Under the Climate Change Act passed in December 2008, carbon budgets were 
put in place including legally binding ceilings on the level of  allowed UK emis-
sions over periods of   years. In its first report, the CCC has advised on the level 
of  the budgets for 2008–2012, 2013–2017, and 2018–2022. The current budgets 
require an emissions reduction of  34 percent in 2020 relative to 1990 and if  a 
global deal is reached this target will be increased to 43 percent.
To achieve these targets the development of  markets for offshore and onshore 
wind-power, biomass for power, nuclear and carbon capture and storage is crucial. 
These specific technologies and sectors are considered key growth sectors by the 
UK government and they promise to have the most success in the UK based on 
the factors size, expense and environmental impact.
The first real potential driver of  change for purely renewable power generation 
can be seen in the offshore wind sector, which allows for the exploitation of  free, 
6 Committee on Climate Change (CCC), Carbon Budgets Advice for 2008-202, UK, <http://www.theccc.org.
uk/carbon-budgets/>..
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supposedly limitless and clean sources of  energy. Yet, while wind power seems like 
one of  the best options for the UK to hit its renewable targets, its potential is far 
from limitless. The UK is world leader for offshore wind capacity, having recently 
overtaken Denmark. The technology lacks popularity in other countries, where 
installing turbines on land is comparatively easier. The UK’s renewable energy 
plans rely heavily on offshore turbines. However, the cost of  renewable energy 
seems to be increasing. In fact, Britain’s biggest operator of  offshore wind farms 
Centrica released a report that found that it is now more expensive to build an 
offshore wind farm than a nuclear power plant in the UK.7 Many companies such 
as Shell and BP have pulled out of  the UK’s wind energy sector for the foresee-
able future and instead focus on projects in the US which supposedly offer better 
returns. Given this current economic climate and without government subsides, it 
is therefore unlikely that the UK will build new offshore wind farms as the proj-
ects are expensive to install and prone to delays. While onshore wind farms would 
offer comparative advantages in this situation, objections and complaints exist 
regarding the noise and effect on landscapes, particular given the small size of  the 
UK and thus potential density of  wind farms. Unless the government makes a 
concentrated push on swaying public opinion on onshore turbines, offshore wind 
projects enjoying large government subsidies are among the most suitable renew-
able options to help the UK meet its targets.
Biomass for power, on the other hand, is a less suitable option for the UK. Un-
like coal, which releases new carbon dioxide into the atmosphere when it is burnt, 
biomass is seen as carbon neutral, because burning organic material like elephant 
grass or willow simply releases the carbon dioxide that the plant has absorbed 
from the atmosphere while it was growing. The UK has one of  the most generous 
government subsidy schemes in the world. Biomass electricity generators will re-
ceive . renewable obligation certificates (ROCs) for every mega-watt (MW) hour 
of  electricity they produce from non-food crop biomass sources. Biomass is only 
being looked at as a viable option to actually compete in the renewables market as 
of  2013 when power stations are expected to have to buy all their carbon-emission 
permits, rather than being given a large proportion free as they are now. A national 
example is the Drax Power station. It is the biggest source of  power in the UK, as 
well as the largest coal fired plant in Western Europe. In November 2008, Proj-
ect Willow, a £2 billion joint venture with Siemens to build three power stations 
that will burn not coal but “biomass” such as wood chips and peanut husks was 
unveiled. Turning the country’s biggest polluter into one of  its largest producers 
of  clean energy sounds like an attractive solution, but the practicality of  the plan 
is limited. The organic material to be burned is much less “energy dense” than 
7 Ed Crooks & Fiona Harvey, Offshore wind costs alarm Centrica, in: Financial Times, 14-11-2008, p. 12..
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coal, so much more of  it has to be burnt to get the same amount of  energy. The 
proposal for three 300 MW plants would require vast quantities of  waste wood 
and other organic material, much of  it shipped from as far away as Canada. Drax 
would need 30 times the length of  the UK in biomass material every year to run 
these three new plants. Biomass for large scale power generation is a relatively 
infantile industry that seems to offer a lot more questions about where the actual 
biomass will come from and how it will be transported than can be answered at 
this stage.
While nuclear it is not a new clean technology, or as some might even argue not a 
clean technology at all, because energy is used when mining and enriching of  ura-
nium to make nuclear fuel, the reactors do not emit CO2 when generating electric-
ity. It is a low carbon technology. Nuclear is one option that is commercially viable, 
can last for decades and also meets energy security demands. Nuclear power sup-
plies 3.8 percent of  the energy consumption of  the UK, according to figures pub-
lished by The Department of  Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR). 
The government has called for the nuclear program to go beyond replacing the 
existing stock of  23 reactors and to contribute »a significantly higher proportion« 
of  the nation’s energy needs in the years ahead with the aim for Britain to become 
a world leader in the development of  nuclear power technology. The government 
announced its approval of  the construction of  a new generation of  nuclear power 
stations in January 2009, along with a series of  measures designed to attract the 
support of  private sector investors, who are expected to pay for the new reactors 
and their eventual decommissioning costs.8
Regulatory issues stemming from the EU hinder the development of  nuclear pow-
ers’ full potential in the UK. For example, the majority share of  British Energy 
(the nuclear provider in the UK) has been sold to EDF which is 85 percent owned 
by the French government. Because of  concerns of  the UK’s energy supply falling 
entirely to foreign hands, Centrica is bidding for 25 percent of  the company. The 
deal should be done, but EDF could be forced to sell several UK power stations 
to get approval from the European Commission for its £12 billion takeover of  
British Energy, since a combined EDF-BE would produce almost a quarter of  the 
country’s electricity and become the sole provider of  nuclear power. This is only 
the first hurdle as each plant takes about 0 years to build.
Finally, Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) has the most potential to help reduce 
GHG gases in the UK as it can reduce emissions by up to 90 percent, depending 
8 Department of  Energy and Climate Change (DECC), The Energy White Paper 2007: ‘Meeting the energy challenge,’ 
UK, <http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/publications/white_paper_0/white_paper_0.aspx>..
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on the plant type. Traditional coal-fired power stations are inefficient and only 
harvest about 35 percent of  the energy in the fuel. Coal in particular is widely ac-
cessible and relatively cheap, and is relied upon to generate power for some of  the 
world’s biggest economies. But coal is also the dirtiest fuel, and burning it in power 
plants produces more carbon dioxide than any other form of  electricity genera-
tion. If  it can be proved that CCS technology can work on a large commercial 
scale the potential opportunities are huge.
CCS is central to the UK’s plans to tackle climate change. In his first statement 
as head of  the newly created department of  energy and climate change (DECC), 
Ed Miliband committed the UK to cut carbon emissions to 80 percent of  1990 
levels by 2050 and stressed the importance of  investing in CCS to achieve this 
aim. However, the government has been criticized by many in the energy industry 
for failing to move fast enough with regard to CCS. BP has pulled out of  the UK 
government’s carbon capture and storage competition, leaving just three consortia 
still bidding to build a government-backed CCS demonstration plant in the UK. 
With BP Alternative Energy’s withdrawal from the competition, the three bidders 
remaining are E.ON UK, Peel Power, and Scottish Power. BP has quit the CCS 
competition, because it was unable to find a partner power generator to put to-
gether a consortium. BP insists that its withdrawal from the UK competition does 
not represent a shift in the company’s policy on CCS.
The government seems to fully support CCS capabilities. Ed Miliband announced 
the funding for up to four CCS demonstration plants at the end of  April 2009. In 
case these plants were to guarantee a capture of  100 percent of  emissions over 
the next five years, legislation is expeceted to permit new coal-fired power plants 
only on the basis of  a full-scale CCS retro-fit. While CCS should pay a significant 
role in achieving the 2020 targets, its success depends how quickly the retrofits 
can begin and when the new CCS plants go underway. It will certainly play a 
crucial role for climate protection in the decades that follow, both in the UK and 
internationally.
Conclusion
While changes in businesses in Britain and across Europe as well as institutional 
developments such as the DECC are encouraging, these measures are not suffi-
cient if  the UK or the EU are to achieve their ambitious climate targets. Each of  
the technologies addressed above have a role to play in the transition to a low car-
bon economy. As there is no one technology that can successfully and significantly 
reduce emissions, it has to be a mix of  renewable and low carbon options that 
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will help achieve these targets. Current treaties and regulation do not provide clear 
long term directions for energy companies. As such, private sector development 
will continue to develop slowly with costly setbacks. The current economic crisis 
and the restriction of  private sector finance that comes with it puts further em-
phasis on clear government regulation for long term planning on investment for 
the private sector. Where private investments are constrained, the government will 
have to provide for long term and reliable commitment to financial incentives and 
subsidies. If  it fails to do so, the needed technologies will not be further developed, 
climate treaties may not be signed and the long term consequence may be the 
failure to achieve ambitious renewable energy and climate protection targets. This 
paper calls for the EU to establish such clear, specific and long term strategies 
to address the outlined problems. Without government subsidies and a reliable 
framework for investments in technologies, innovation, research and development 
on renewable energies, Europe will not be able to transform into a low-carbon 
economy and hence sustain effective climate protection efforts.
Eva Strickmann, rapporteur for panel III and former member of the IFST team
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Summary
Alejandro Ribó Labastida
Dr. Robert Mudida, from the University of  Nairobi, presented a paper on Africa’s 
trade challenges and strategies for the future. Esra Pakin from Istanbul Bilgi Uni-
versity elaborated on the economic potentials and problems of  the Gulf  Coopera-
tion Council (GCC) countries. After the two presentations, the discussants, Wolf-
gang Lehofer and Detlev von Busch, commented on the two papers.
Trade for Africans is “a means to develop, to improve the quality of  their life,” 
said Robert Mudida. Yet, the position of  Africa in world’s trade is clearly defi-
cient, in 200 it only counted for 3.1% of  all world exports, while in 193 that 
figure accounted for .%; this is the product of  the swift decline of  Africa’s 
share of  world exports in the 1970s and 1980s. If  the 1980s was considered “the 
lost decade,” and the 1990s was nicknamed “the second liberalization” with the 
emergence of  processes of  democratization and institutionalization that later cre-
ated much frustration among African people, the 2000s seem to have brought a 
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African renaissance with the creation of  the African Union and the creation of  the 
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).
Yet the challenges that Africa faces are steep, for there are many economic and 
political problems for the continent’s integration: an overlapping membership be-
tween the different cooperation organizations; a deficient, and perhaps inadequate, 
imitation of  other integration processes, mainly the European Union; an exces-
sive ambition and formalism in the projects of  integration at work; overlaps in 
the production and manufacturing of  African countries, e. g. coffee; the small size 
of  most African economies; deficient infrastructure and transportation networks; 
structural problems with the implementation of  treaties, regulations and planned 
strategies; or the many multilateral concerns with agricultural subsidies, competi-
tion in services and strict enforcement of  intellectual property rights.
According to Robert Mudida, strategies to face these problems include the follow-
ing aspects. First, Africa would need a trade strategy, learning from other coun-
tries’ experiences, e. g. Chile. Second, the state should promote trade, though the 
African state is “a predatory state,” benefiting a very small clique of  people. Third, 
complementary measures would be needed to build infrastructure and transporta-
tion networks, create competition, fight corruption, improve the financial system, 
and attain real implementation. Fourth, cooperation would need to be more flex-
ible and perhaps start with other less obvious areas, e. g. transportation infrastruc-
ture. Finally, African countries should coordinate their strategies in multilateral 
negotiations, such as in the WTO.
How could these strategies be implemented? Institutions are the key. Africa’s 
institutional structure needs to de-concentrate, decentralize and devolve power, ex-
plained Robert Mudida, replying to a question by Emma Argutyan about the ways 
to change the relevant institutions. In the 1950s–0s, the solution was the state, 
but groups seized power to grunt: “it’s our time to eat.” In the 1970s-80s, the solu-
tion was the market, but the poor paid for the wave of  neoliberal reforms. Today, 
“if  Africa is to claim the twenty-first century” it needs institutional reform, it needs 
“liberalism from below,” says Mudida.
Esra Pakin’s paper entitled “The Rise of  the Gulf: Sustainable or Temporary?” 
focused on the “bright picture” and the “dark clouds” looming over the Gulf  
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – i. e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
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On the bright side, Pakin sees the large production and export of  oil plus vast gas 
reserves; the economic benefits for these countries’ population and their inter-
national presence thanks to the oil and gas proceeds; the diversification of  the 
economy towards construction, finance – for example Dubai’s gold and commodi-
ties exchange market –, insurance, exports of  cement and steel, or tourism.
On the negative side, she reveals the fact that the GCC countries account for only 
1.5% of  the global production and for 4% of  the world’s exports; Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in these states is as low as 2.4% of  all FDI; the diversification of  
the economy is occurring at a very slow pace; their monetary union has problems, 
mainly related to the pegging of  their currencies to the dollar; the current financial 
crisis has left them in a very unstable situation – on the one hand they are injecting 
great amounts of  liquidity into the market, but on the other hand their assets and 
exchange market are plummeting in value, while oil demand and price are drop-
ping; there is the seemingly sempiternal threat of  terrorism and the alienation of  
Iran; and, finally, their increasing population and the decrease of  the number of  
skilled workers in these countries is considered a socio-economic time bomb.
Esra Pakin’s recommendations to confront these challenges include the follow-
ing steps. First, currencies should leave the dollar peg and adopt a trade-weighted 
currency basket. Second, further cooperation with Europe and the US is needed 
to defeat al-Qaida and other security threats, like the sea piracy along the Somali 
Iskandar Jahja (Summer School 2008) and Head of Program David Bosold
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coast. Third, investments into tourism, international sport and cultural events need 
to be increased. Finally, more resources should be allocated to research, develop-
ment and training.
Questions from the audience dealt with regional integration, institutional reform, 
education, the impact of  conflict in Africa, the consequences of  foreign inter-
vention, and possible contributions by Europe to growth and stability in the two 
regions. 
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Strategic Options of Economic Integration and Global Trade 
for Africa in the 21st Century
Robert Mudida
Introduction
Despite huge strides in economic development made in many parts of  the world 
over the last few decades, many people in Africa still remain in dire poverty. Ac-
cording to the 200/2008 United Nations Human Development Report, the 
twenty countries with the lowest human development are all located in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Trade has often been identified as a vital engine of  economic growth 
and development to facilitate an African renaissance in the 21st Century. However, 
economic integration schemes in Africa continue to suffer from many limita-
tions and Africa’s participation in the global economy remains miniscule. Regional 
integration arrangements in Africa, for example, continue to be characterized by 
overlapping membership and weak institutions. At the turn of  the new century 
Africa’s share of  world trade plummeted to levels below those in the 190s when 
it had accounted for 2 percent of  world trade. The erosion of  Africa’s world trade 
share represents a staggering income loss of  billions of  dollars annually. The ac-
celeration of  globalization seems to have placed Africa at the threshold of  further 
marginalization.
With the formation of  the African Union in 2002 and associated institutions such 
as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), it appeared that 
there was a renewed impetus for development on the continent. A new and better 
calibre of  African leaders emerged in some countries in the 21st century, although 
with some notable exceptions. This paper will explore what needs to be achieved 
for economic integration to be more effective in Africa and for Africa to partici-
pate more effectively in global trade. The relationship between different economic 
integration initiatives in Africa to global trade liberalization in the framework of  
the WTO will be explored. It will be argued that in order for African states to 
become more fully integrated in the global economy they will need to adopt a 
more pro-active rather than reactive approach. Such an approach will center on 
building more effective institutions at the national and regional levels so as to 
give Africa a greater voice in the 21st century. Africa’s development challenges are 
essentially about a crisis of  institutions at the political, economic and social levels. 
Weak regional institutions reflect internal weaknesses of  member states. The paper 
will explore competing conceptual constructs of  regional integration in Africa 
with a view to arriving at a set of  strategic options for enhanced effectiveness. For 
Robert Mudida
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example, open regionalism based on neo-classical assumptions will be contrasted 
with the concept of  “regionalism from below” which emphasizes the importance 
of  civil society and informal organizations in regionalism. Concerns of  African 
states arising from the existing multilateral framework and current trade round of  
the WTO will also be examined as will be strategic options for integrating Africa 
more fully into the global economy.
Africa’s Position in World Trade
Africa’s relative performance in world trade has been generally declining over the 
past thirty years. Although the levels of  merchandise trade have increased for all 
African countries, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of  world trade has been in decline 
for several decades, most markedly since the 1980s.1 Table 1 shows, for example, 
that Africa’s share of  world exports was lower in 200 when it stood at 3.1% as 
compared to 193 when its share of  world trade was 5.7%. The extent of  this 
poor performance becomes clear when we compare Africa’s performance with 
that of  the Asian region whose share of  world trade has doubled over the same 
period reaching 27.8 percent in 200. This implies that Africa’s trade performance 
in global terms is far below that of  other developing regions. These declining 
trends indicate Africa’s increased marginalization in world trade.
Figure 1: Africa’s Share of World Trade
Source: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), Media Briefing Note, no. 1/2007.
 European Centre for International Political Economy, Africa and World Trade, Media Briefing Note, no. /200, p. .
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The figure reveals that even during the period 2003 and 2006 where there has been 
a slight upswing in Africa’s world share, this mostly reflected rising oil prices. Thus 
the upswing is only confined to a handful of  countries, such as Angola and Nige-
ria. While this constitutes a positive development for oil producers, most African 
countries have continued to experience deterioration of  their role in world trade.
Sachs and Warner2 assert that Africa has been left out of  the process of  globaliza-
tion. The World Bank estimates that losses in world trade have cost Africa almost 
$ 0 billion a year due to a lack of  product diversification and falling market 
shares for traditional commodities.3 African states are still heavily dependent on 
traditional export commodities despite their low income elasticity of  demand and 
their declining terms of  trade in the long run. Continuing concentration on these 
traditional exports will have adverse consequences on income and employment.4
Rationale and Fundamental Challenges of Economic Integration Initiatives in Africa
Economic integration refers to the merging of  the economies and economic 
policies of  two or more countries in a given region to various degrees.5 Eco-
nomic integration occurs whenever a group of  countries in the same region join 
together to form a regional trading bloc. Development economists have argued 
that developing states should orient their trade towards each other. They base 
their arguments on the notion that greater collective self-reliance will be fostered 
and that there are comparative advantage changes to South-South as opposed to 
North-South trade. The fundamental economic rationale for economic integra-
tion of  African economies is a long-term dynamic where integration provides the 
opportunity for industries that have not been established yet as well as those that 
have in order to take advantage of  the economies of  large scale production facili-
tated by expanded markets. In the absence of  integration, each separate state may 
not have a sufficiently large domestic market to enable local industries to lower 
their production costs through economies of  scale.7 Economic integration also 
provides the possibility of  an increase in trade patterns where free trade within 
regional trading blocs leads to a shift in production from high to low-cost member 
states. Given the tiny and fragmented economies in Africa, the issue is not whether 
Africa should be integrated but rather how.
2 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Sources of  Slow Growth in African Economies, in: Journal of  African Econo-
mies, no. 3/99, pp. 33–36.
3 World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, Washington, DC, 2000.
4 Ibid.
5 Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development, London 200. 
6 W. Arthur Lewis, The Slowing Down of  the Engine of  Growth, in: American Economic Review, no. 4/980, 
pp. 555–54.
7 Todaro and Smith, op. cit. (note 5).
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Despite these potential advantages there are fundamental challenges for economic 
integration initiatives in Africa. Africa has a multitude of  sub-regional schemes 
and strong political rhetoric supporting them, but the results remain modest. The 
Abuja Treaty of  99 envisaged an African economic community, but progress has 
been mostly sub-regional. The main economic integration schemes in Africa are 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of  West Af-
rican States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC).8 However, intra-
regional trade among African countries remains low accounting for less than 10% 
of  the total trade of  African States. Many African states produce similar primary 
products thereby limiting the potential for trade.
Asymmetries in development among member states within a regional trading bloc 
have constituted a major obstacle to economic integration in Africa. A fear per-
sists that the more developed and relatively larger members of  the trading bloc 
will get disproportionate benefits. Once the poorer member states open up their 
economies to the more developed member states the result could be flooding of  
the domestic market with cheaper goods and the closure of  domestic industries 
in the poorer states.9 This factor contributed to the collapse of  the East African 
Community in 1997 since Kenya, which had a relatively more developed manufac-
turing base compared to Uganda and Tanzania, was considered to be gaining more 
from the economic integration.
Many African states belong to several regional integration initiatives at the same 
time leading to overlapping and conflicting obligations. Kenya, for example, be-
longs to both the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa. Tanzania belonged both to SADC and COMESA and even-
tually had to pull out of  COMESA because of  conflicting objectives of  the two 
regional trading blocs.
The design and objectives of  regional integration schemes in Africa have also been 
driven by a preference for formal trade and factor market integration rather than a 
focus on basic policy coordination and collaboration in regional projects. This fac-
tor has resulted in excessively ambitious models of  regional integration. However, 
Africa’s unfavorable structural features such as competitive primary production, 
small size, low levels of  per capita incomes, limited manufacturing capacity, weak 
8 World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, op. cit. (note 3).
9 George Saitoti, The Challenges of  Economic and Institutional Reforms in Africa, Aldershot 2002, pp. 101–103.
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financial sectors, poor transportation and communications infrastructure make 
such ambitious models difficult to implement.10
African integration schemes have also suffered from implementation lapses, in-
cluding those due to weak governance. Many states cannot cope with the loss of  
national sovereignty that integration schemes would entail. Other factors that have 
limited economic integration in the African context include a lack of  adequate 
technical and management expertise, and also concerns about losing trade tax 
revenues.
A number of  African states have also experienced protracted conflicts. These 
include, for example, the Democratic Republic of  Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Somalia and Sudan. Such conflicts hinder effective regional integration because 
the emphasis of  states becomes to address domestic instabilities and they cannot 
therefore effectively focus on fostering regional integration.
Linking Economic Integration and Africa’s Position in World Trade
An important debate with respect to regional integration is whether regional 
groupings will fragment the world economy and run counter to the recent global-
ization of  trade. It can be argued that liberalizing trade at the sub-regional level 
10 Ibid.
Anselme Harelimana from Rwanda (Summer School 2008)
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excludes non-member countries from preferential trade thereby offsetting global-
ization at a broader multilateral level. However, for countries in Africa, effective 
regional trading blocs can provide a buffer against the negative effects of  global-
ization while still permitting the dynamic benefits of  intra-union specialization 
and greater equality among members to take place.11 Globalization refers to the 
integration of  markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree not witnessed 
before and permitting individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around 
the world further, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.12 A challenge for 
African states is to gain from the trend towards globalization. Stronger regional 
integration blocs will improve Africa’s position in world trade, especially if  such 
economic integration encourages greater competitiveness of  Africa’s products. 
Regional integration can also encourage investment in the export sector in African 
states as entire regions can be promoted as one investment area. More effective 
economic integration blocs in Africa will also give African states a greater voice in 
multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization.
Concerns for African States in the current Doha Trade Round
The current round of  WTO multilateral trade negotiations was launched in No-
vember 2001 in Doha, Qatar. It is intended to enhance the development relevance 
of  the WTO, although expectations for its successful conclusion remain mixed. 
The collapse of  the Doha Ministerial in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003 un-
derscored the challenges faced by the negotiators.13 African states have several key 
concerns relating to the Doha round.
Agriculture remains a fundamental concern for African states because many of  
their economies are still predominantly agricultural. The WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture is seen as one of  the most controversial because special and differen-
tial treatment is, in effect, provided to developed rather than developing countries. 
African, and other developing countries, accepted the Uruguay Round Agreements 
as a whole mainly because they thought they would benefit from agricultural 
liberalization and subsidy reduction in the OECD countries under the Agreement 
on Agriculture. However, these promises were often not fulfilled and loopholes 
such as the “Green Box” permitted supposedly non-trade distorting subsidies 
by the developed countries. As a result, OECD countries’ agricultural subsidies 
have been legitimized and have increased rather than decreased since the Uruguay 
11 Todaro and Smith, op. cit. (note 5).
12 Thomas L. Friedman, Understanding Globalisation: The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York, NY, 2000, pp. 3–1.
13 Carlos A. Primo Braga and Elwyn Grainger-Jones, The Multilateral Trading System: Mid-Flight Turbulence or Systems 
Failure?, in: Richard S. Newfarmer (ed.), Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues (The World Bank), 
Washington, DC, 200, pp. 27–42.
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Round.14 Many farmers in Africa have therefore been pushed out of  farming or 
lost their land because they cannot compete.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is also of  concern to Afri-
can states. Trade in services was brought into GATT for the first time under the 
Uruguay Round despite misgivings among developing states. As a compromise 
it was agreed that a “bottom-up” approach would be used so that each member 
would have the right to decide on the sectors it would open up and the limitations 
to liberalizing each sector. However, the GATS agreement is one from which the 
African states reap little benefit because of  the unequal competitive positions of  
service suppliers from the North and South. African countries have therefore been 
put under considerable pressure to liberalize in service sectors where they cannot 
compete thus adversely affecting local service industries and development objec-
tives.15 International trade in services is dominated by a few large multinational 
corporations and given their massive financial strength, world-wide networks and 
access to sophisticated information technology infrastructure, it is difficult for 
indigenous African country providers, which are mainly small and medium enter-
prises, to catch up. Liberalization in services has therefore aggravated the divide in 
supply capacity between developed and developing states.
Yet another area of  concern for African states in the Doha Round is the Trade-
Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. Intellectual 
property rights were brought for the first time into a multilateral trade framework 
during the Uruguay Round. This was done especially at the behest of  multina-
tional corporations in the pharmaceutical and information technology industries, 
especially in the United States, which claimed they were undergoing significant 
losses from the inadequate protection of  their intellectual property abroad. Afri-
can states, like other developing countries, resisted the TRIPs agreement on the 
basis that it would benefit multinational corporations while preventing their own 
enterprises from copying technologies to develop as had been done historically 
in the developed countries. The TRIPs agreement, however, came into effect in 
1995 and it sets high standards of  protection for patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
and industrial design and licenses, allowing patents to be granted on products and 
processes for twenty years.1 The issue of  patenting of  life forms under the TRIPs 
agreement also received widespread criticism from African states. In addition to 
raising fundamental ethnical issues such as the patenting of  the human genome, 
the agreement has in a sense facilitated “biopiracy” through the patenting of  life 
14 Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of  International Trade Negotiations 
The Lessons of  Cancun, London 2004, pp. 25–49.
15 Ibid.
1 Jawara and Kwa, ibid. 
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forms, including plants and their medicinal functions, which were previously avail-
able for public use in African countries.17
Strategies for Overcoming the Challenges of Poor Trade Performance in Africa in the 
21st century
African states therefore face a myriad of  challenges in trade both at the level of  
regional integration and at the WTO multilateral level. African countries have 
considerable potential, but realizing this potential requires action on several fronts 
especially to raise international competitiveness. Sustaining competitive and stable 
real exchange rates are vital to improving export performance in Africa. Real 
exchange rates are critical for export growth. Chile’s experience suggests that 
economic competitiveness need not come at the cost of  adequate integration 
with the global capital market.18 Initially interest and exchange rates in Chile were 
unfavorable to export growth, but gradually these factors changed leading to an in-
crease in the profitability of  exports relative to producing non-tradable commodi-
ties. The Chilean experience provides valuable lessons for African states seeking 
to improve their competitiveness. Chile’s exports have been one of  the engines 
behind its development. The export sector in Chile represents about 40 percent of  
the country’s Gross Domestic Product. Chile’s export market diversification pro-
vides an important lesson for the export policy of  African countries which tend 
to concentrate on a narrow range of  markets and products.19 Kenya’s exports, for 
example, tend to be concentrated on the East African region and the European 
Union. Effective market diversification can, however, only be achieved by a well-
developed and implemented export policy. Chile provides a compelling case for a 
limited but important role of  the state in export promotion. Chile’s endowments, 
like many African countries, have included a rich natural resource base. Its export 
promotion policies show that foreign direct investment is responsive to activities 
that open up new export possibilities or introduce new technologies. In addition, a 
growth strategy spearheaded by a few niche products can lead to important divi-
dends. Chile’s experience also shows that temporary well-managed subsidies can 
spur the growth of  non-traditional exports.20
The East Asian experience also reinforces the argument that the state can play an 
important role in promoting exports by establishing a pro-export incentive struc-
17 Ibid.
18 World Bank, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 219–233.
19 Robert Mudida, The Chilean Experience: Lessons for Kenyan Economic Policy, in: KASNEB Newsline, no. 3, July-Sep-
tember 2002, pp. 3–7.
20 Manuel Agosin, Export Performance in Chile: Lessons for Africa, in: Gerald K Helleiner (ed.), Non-Traditional Exports 
and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Experiences (forthcoming).
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ture that coexisted with moderate but highly variable protection of  the domestic 
market.21 A variety of  instruments were used in East Asian countries including 
export credit, duty-free imports for exporters and their suppliers, export targets, 
and tax incentives. These measures can be studied by African governments and 
adopted where appropriate.
African tariffs and other trade restrictions are still higher than in other develop-
ing regions and anti-export bias is still considerable. This has significant impact 
especially because of  the small size of  African economies and the importance of  
imported inputs. Many African states are still heavily dependent on trade taxes for 
about one-third of  government revenue.22
It is vital to introduce complementary measures beyond trade policy to improve 
Africa’s competitiveness. Trade reforms need to be accompanied by measures that 
lay a firm foundation for investment and production. These include an effective 
and non-corrupt tax administration, functioning commercial courts, reliable infra-
structure, and a working financial system.
21 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford 1993, pp. 12–13.
22 World Bank, op. cit. (note 3).
Dominik Antonowicz, Gerald Neugschwandtner, and Alejandro Ribó Labastida (all Summer School 
2002)
 
Alumni Conference 2008 80
Panel IV: Economic 
Integration and Global 
Trade
Given shortfalls in domestic investment because of  low incomes, it is vital for Afri-
can states to attract substantial investment to the export sector. A major challenge 
in this respect is that many African countries are still ranked among the riskiest 
places to do business and even retaining domestic savings is difficult. A critical pri-
ority is for African governments to provide a safe and profitable business environ-
ment. Institutional reform is key to improve the business environment. Institutions 
in this context refer to sets of  formal or informal rules governing the actions of  
individuals and organizations and the interactions of  participants in the develop-
ment process.23 Formal legal rules may, for example, ensure that contracts are en-
forced, property rights honored and competition maintained. Informal rules relate 
to unwritten rules which are deeply embedded in a society’s culture and reflect its 
fundamental values. Institutions simultaneously enable and constrain the actions of  
individuals or organizations. Institutional reforms specify new rules or change old 
ones with the intention of  changing the behavior of  individuals and organizations. 
African states should aim to create institutions which aim to promote entrepre-
neurship, profits and capital accumulation while achieving an overall objective of  
promoting the common good.24 It is necessary to undertake measures to strength-
en the state and manage public resources in more accountable ways. Domestic and 
international pressure must be sustained so as to ensure greater entrenchment of  
democratic values in many African states. Such values combined with a greater 
concern for the common good will help to stem the massive levels of  corruption 
that have impeded development in many parts of  Africa. Institutional reform will 
also help to reduce protracted conflicts in many parts of  Africa because it will 
ensure that basic needs of  the larger proportion of  the population are more ad-
equately met. There are close linkages between security and development.25
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) also constitute an important vehicle 
for improving Africa’s trade prospects in the 21st century. They are based on the 
principle of  “more trade not aid.” An example is the attempt to create a free trade 
area between the European Commission of  the European Union and the Group 
of  African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). The EPAs are a fundamental 
element of  the Cotonou Agreement, which is the latest agreement in the his-
tory of  ACP-EU Development Co-operation. The Cotonou Agreement aims at 
poverty reduction while contributing to the sustainable development and gradual 
integration of  the ACP countries into the world economy.
23 World Bank, Entering the 2st Century: World Development Report 999/2000, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 3–30.
24 Delphin Rwegasira, From Recovery to Accelerated Development: Some Key Issues for Twenty-First Century Africa, in: 
Ernest Aryeetey et al. (eds.), Asia and Africa in the Global Economy, Tokyo 2003, pp. 385–399.
25 Mudida, The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and Human Needs Approach, in: Katrin Brockmann, 
Hans Bastian Hauck and Stuart Reigeluth (eds.), From Conflict to Regional Stability: Linking Security and Development 
(Research Institute of  the DGAP), Berlin 2008, pp. 11–22.
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Despite past challenges, the case for stronger economic integration in Africa 
remains compelling. There is a widely held view within Africa that African unity 
could help stem its political and economic marginalization. The promise of  pan-
Africanism has kept alive the ideals of  the Lagos Plan of  Action despite formi-
dable challenges in its implementation. Thus a vital policy question for African 
states in the 21st century is how regionalism can help to attain Africa’s develop-
ment goals in a globalized economy. Given Africa’s modest success with regional 
integration, it is vital that a regionalism with a more flexible design is stressed, 
based on cooperation among countries to jointly implement specific projects. Such 
cooperation should include transportation and communications infrastructure in 
addition to investment regulation and trade policies.
Since many African economies are small, both individually and in sub-groups, the 
potential welfare gains from freer trade in Africa may be limited in the short to 
medium term. This implies that perhaps the principal focus of  integration should 
be on promoting investment rather than intra-regional free trade. The creation of  
an economic space where investors can produce for regional as well as global mar-
kets may provide small African economies with better growth opportunities than 
simply removing trade barriers among themselves.
The concerns that African countries have relating to the current Doha Round 
underscore the need to pay more attention to multilateral negotiations and try 
to influence the outcome. Many African states do not even have representatives 
in the WTO. African states should participate in setting the global agenda and 
partner with other developing countries, for example, in Latin America and Asia 
to negotiate for the dismantling of  restrictive trade practices that inhibit export 
diversification in poor countries. To improve the multilateral trade regime, insti-
tutional reforms within the WTO are required. These reforms should focus on 
how decisions are made, what gets put on the agenda, how disagreements are 
resolved and how rules are enforced.2 Such reforms, if  effective, will ensure that 
the benefits of  globalization are more equitably shared. The agricultural sector, 
for example, accounts for almost two-thirds of  the economic gains that could be 
obtained by dismantling the present global system of  merchandise trade barriers 
and farm subsidies.27
2 Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalisation Work, London 200, pp. 1–101.
27 Kym Anderson and Will Martin, Agriculture: The Key to Success of  the Doha Round, in: Richard S. Newfarmer (ed.), 
op. cit. (note 13), pp. 77–9.
 
Alumni Conference 2008 8
Panel IV: Economic 
Integration and Global 
Trade
Conclusion: Towards a New Trade paradigm?
The current trade challenges faced by African states expose the shortcomings of  
the neo-liberal model of  economic development which has dominated the WTO. 
An important aspect of  the new agenda is to recognize that trade is an instrument 
and not the ultimate goal of  policy. The fundamental policy goal is economic 
development in the context of  a fair, inclusive and politically acceptable globaliza-
tion.28 Thus for African states, trade represents much more than simply commer-
cial interactions—it is a vital avenue for their development. “Open regionalism” is 
informed by neo-classical assumptions that the market is the key driving force of  
integration.29 This approach is consistent with unfettered economic globalization 
and has a tendency of  reinforcing in some respects the inequalities in the inter-
national system. In view of  their development objectives, African states should 
pursue an approach to economic integration and multilateralism that mitigates 
the adverse effects of  globalization on their economies. Such an approach should 
emphasize collective self-reliance through the mobilization of  regional resources 
and also promote “regionalism from below.” This entails underscoring the im-
portance of  civil society and the informal sector in the economic integration 
framework.30 Such home-grown approaches serve to improve Africa’s situation in 
economic integration and its position in global trade. Enabling macro-economic 
policies should also be pursued at the domestic level underpinned by measures 
for improved accountability and infrastructure. Institutional reform is vital at the 
political, economic and social levels. Such reform should aim at infusing a culture 
of  greater concern for the common good. Only then can Africa truly claim the 
21st century.
28 Thomas I. Palley, Globalisation and the Changing Trade Debate: Suggestions for a New Agenda, in: Public Policy Brief  
(The Levy Economics Institute of  Bard College), no. 9/200, pp. –6.
29 John K. Akokpari, Dilemmas of  Regional Integration and Development, in: Akokpari et. al. (eds.), African Union and 
Its Institutions (Centre for Conflict Resolution), Cape Town 2008, pp. 8–0.
30 Ibid.
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The Rise of the Gulf: Myth or Reality?1
Esra Pakin
The Arab states of  the Persian Gulf, namely the kingdoms of  Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia, the sultanate of  Oman, and the emirates of  Kuwait, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), constitute a region with some of  the fastest growing econo-
mies in the world.2 These six countries forming the members of  the Gulf  Coop-
eration Council (GCC) are increasingly integrating into the global arena, investing 
abroad, welcoming foreign workers, and hosting such events as the 200 Asian 
Games in Qatar. They are all members of  the Arab League and World Trade Or-
ganization, and furthermore, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE are promi-
nent members of  OPEC.3 Despite the boom they have enjoyed thanks to high 
oil prices, the region is vulnerable to some problems pertaining to domestic and 
international developments. This regional bloc will be a true global actor to the 
degree that it achieved monetary unity, diversified its economy, created a vigorous 
native work force and eliminated state and non-state threats around its vicinity. To 
date, the Gulf  countries have been taking active steps to overcome these obstacles 
albeit to varying degrees and with varying success.
Success story: foreign investment, finance and Formula 1
Looking at the bright picture first, the Gulf  enjoys large production and export 
volumes of  oil and oil products. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the Gulf ’s 
vast gas reserves. Qatar’s gas reserves alone amount to more than twice the com-
bined reserves of  North America and the North Sea. Iran’s alienation in the ener-
gy sector also adds to the region’s revenues and leverage.4 Their account surpluses 
not only enable the GCC to build up international reserves but also help reduce 
1 The author would like to thank Mari Luomi and David Chaim Weiss for their invaluable comments on the earlier ver-
sion of  this paper.
2 Saudi Arabia: Population 24 million, GDP per head (PPP) $ 22,828, Real GDP growth 7.2%; United Arab Emirates: 
Population 5.2 million, GDP per head (PPP) $ 28,222, Real GDP growth 8.5%; Qatar: Population 1.3 million, GDP 
per head (PPP) $ 53,202, Real GDP growth 11.8%; Kuwait: Population 3.4 million GDP per head (PPP) $ 39,791, Real 
GDP growth .8%; Bahrain: Population: 1 million, GDP per head (PPP) $ 23,233, Real GDP Growth ,9%; Oman: 
Population 2.58 million GDP per head (PPP) $ 19,000 Real GDP growth 5.%, all in: The Economist, Country Brief-
ings. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/countries> (accessed 2-0-2008); CIA The World Factbook—
Oman. Retrieved from <https://www.odci.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mu.html> (accessed 
2-10-2008).
3 OPEC comprises Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Venezuela. Indonesia has suspended membership and will leave the cartel at the end of  2008, and Iraq 
does not have an output quota because of  the country’s post-war chaos.
4 K. R. Singh. Energy Insecurity and Military Misadventures in the Persian Gulf  Region, in: International Studies, no. 
4/200, pp. 293–294, 300. 
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indebtedness.5 According to estimates by the Institute of  International Finance, 
the countries are buyers of  American shares and government bonds, as well as of  
European bonds, shares and foreign companies. Arab oil exporters also invest in 
China in the form of  infrastructure projects or buying property and firms.
The GCC has not only invested in the economies of  and opened its markets for 
major actors but has also reached out to countries such as New Zealand or Malay-
sia. A Free Trade Agreement with New Zealand in September 200 has made the 
GCC New Zealand’s 8th largest export market, particularly in food and machinery.7 
GCC investments to Malaysia have reached great sums in the sectors of  manufac-
turing (i. e. metal products), services, finance, oil and gas. Malaysia also hosts the 
GCC-ASEAN Economic Center, launched in August 2008.8 The Gulf  countries 
have long supported financially weak countries in the Middle East like Egypt and 
Jordan, by providing jobs for their citizens, attracting tourists, engaging in invest-
ment, and sustaining order in an unstable region.9 The International Institute 
of  Finance argues that a large share of  GCC funds goes to the Middle East and 
North Africa, where liberalization and privatization, as well as an increased pace 
of  project implementation have invited capital. Among the recent assets acquired 
by the GCC countries are iron ore mines in Mauritania, bought by Qatar Steel 
for $ 3m in November 200, and a $ 3 billion worth Saudi-financed oil refin-
ery project in Bangladesh, in addition to Saudi refining interests in China, South 
Korea and the Philippines. Furthermore, Gulf-based telecommunication firms 
have spent at least $ 20 billion in countries from Algeria to Singapore.10 The GCC 
countries also engage in research on renewable energies since dependence on fos-
sil fuels is believed to cause harmful ecological effects, drain the treasury through 
subsidies and increase food prices. More importantly, the economies are aware of  
the need to adapt to a post-carbon era once their oil production peaks and eventu-
ally decreases. In this respect, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain have the potential, 
experience and will to realize solar or wind energy projects. Masdar City in Abu 
 Hilary Whiteman. The GCC & the Dollar, in: CNN.com, -2-2008. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/200/
BUSINESS/2/06/gcc.fastfacts/index.html> (accessed 29-0-2008). 
 The Petrodollar Puzzle, in: The Economist, 9--2007.
7 New Zealand Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand-GCC Free Trade Agreement, March 2007. Retrieved 
from <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Agreements/Gulf-Cooperation-Council/index.
php> (accessed 29-0-2008).
8 The Launching Ceremony of  the GCC-ASEAN Economic Center in Malaysia, 2-8-2008. Retrieved from <http://
www.miti.gov.my> (accessed 29-0-2008).
9 Michael Slackman. Slowdown in Persian Gulf  Reverberates in Middle East, in: The New York Times, 28-10-2008. 
Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0/29/world/middleeast/29mideast.html?_r=&oref=slogin> (ac-
cessed 9-11-2008).
10 Cash is going to the poor, too, in: The Economist, 21-2-2008.
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Dhabi for example, aiming to be the first carbon neutral city in the world to house 
0,000 people, is expected to be finished by 206.11
The Gulf  countries also follow a variety of  other ways to re-adjust their econo-
mies to a post-carbon world. In particular, Saudi Arabia’s recent accession to the 
WTO is paving the way for the liberalization and further diversification of  its 
economy. Once insurance was officially regarded as sinful for it meant precaution 
against God’s will, now the country has acknowledged that modern commerce 
requires insurance. With the reevaluation of  previously held religious axioms also 
come additional fields of  investment. Today’s Saudi Arabia is already a big export-
er of  cement and steel, and is intending to invest into aluminum.12 The UAE is 
also seeking to reduce its dependence on hydrocarbons. Its second-largest emirate, 
Dubai, has taken steps to develop its services sector, particularly financial services 
and tourism.13 In addition, the Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX), 
and the first commodities and futures exchange in the Middle East, the Dubai 
Gold and Commodity Exchange (DGCX) were both launched in 2005. With the 
opening of  DGCX for derivatives trading, Dubai is now in the same camp with 
11 Eckart Woertz, Alternative Energy Trends and Implications by the GCC Countries (Gulf  Research Center Reports), 
Dubai, July 2008, pp. 14–19.
12 William Clatanoff, C. Christopher Parlin, Robert Jordan et al., Saudi Arabia’s Accession to the WTO: Is a ‘Revolution’ 
Brewing?, in: Middle East Policy, Spring 200, pp. 5, 12, 21.
13 UAE Factsheet, in: The Economist, 2-9-2008.
Peter Matjasic from Slovenia and Ann-Kristin Otto from Germany, former team member of the 
Forum Euroipean Foreign and Security Policy
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its counterparts in New York, London and Tokyo.14 In terms of  tourism, three 
palm-shaped island-resorts and the recently opened seven-star hotel Burj al-Arab 
illustrate the potential of  the region and the ambitions of  its investors. Dubai’s 
tourism infrastructure also features the Middle East’s first indoor ski-slope, and 
Dubailand, an entertainment complex.15
The Kuwaiti government is equally keen on decreasing its dependence on oil. The 
planned US$ 77 billion City of  Silk is expected to be the largest real estate devel-
opment project in the Middle East.1 As for Bahrain, it has the fastest growing 
economy in the Arab world according to figures by the UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia.17 It is also a popular tourist destination due to the 
kingdom’s heritage and the Middle East’s first international Formula  Circuit.18 As 
for Qatar, the Qatar Science and Technology Park established in 2004 is a home 
not only for technology-based companies from around the world like ExxonMobil, 
Microsoft, Shell and Total, but also for campuses of  Carnegie Mellon, Texas A&M, 
Weill Cornell and other leading universities within a complex called Education City.19 
Lastly, Oman’s economic diversification points to fertilizer and manufacturing 
industries, not to mention several deposits of  exportable minerals and assembling 
industries. Oman’s strategic location as the gateway of  energy sources enhances its 
marketing potential. In the field of  tourism, Oman is also a promising tourist desti-
nation.20 Al Baleed, the cultural capital of  the Sultanate hosts the popular Archaeo-
logical Park. Oman outdoors is also a favorable venue for adventure tourists.21
“Soft belly”: fixed peg, foreign labor, frail security
On the negative side, despite efforts to open up to the world with respect to global 
markets, the GCC output in 2007 accounted for only 1.5% of  world production. 
Furthermore, FDI inflows to GCC countries have been truly modest, comprising a 
total of  less than 2.4% of  global direct investments. Nevertheless, hope rests upon 
14 Ten Global CEO’s Predict the GCC’s Economic Prospects in 2006, January 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.zawya.
com/marketing.cfm?zp&p=/story.cfm/sidZAWYA2006003232> (accessed 29-0-2008).
15 A New Itinerary, in: The Economist, 15-5-2008.
1 Mohamed F. Hamoda. Desalination and water resource management in Kuwait, in: Desalination, no. 1–3 (20-9-2001), 
pp. 385–393; Mohamed Al-bahoua, Zamzam Al-Rakafa et al., Desalination experience in Kuwait, in: Desalination, 
no. –3 (-2-200), pp. 403–4; City of  Silk website. Retrieved from <http://www.madinat-al-hareer.com/> (accessed 
2-10-2008).
17 Bahrain expected to bustle, in: Arabian Business, -2-200. Retrieved from <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/index.
cpm?option=com_content&view=article&id=6> (accessed 2-0-2008).
18 See <http://www.bahraingp.com.bh/> (accessed 9--2008).
19 Qatar Science and Technology Park website. Retrieved from <http://www.qstp.org.qa/output/page.asp> (accessed 
25-10-2008); Small Country, Big Ideas, in: The Economist, 5--2008.
20 Doing Business in Oman (Oman Chamber of  Commerce and Industry website). Retrieved from <http://www.cham-
beroman.com/doing_occi_opportunities9.asp> (accessed 9--2008).
21 Oman Ministry of  Tourism website. Retrieved from <http://www.omantourism.gov.om/> (accessed 9--2008).
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plans for a monetary union, expected to start in 2010. Henceforth, economic and 
financial policies would become unified, a single currency would be introduced 
and the region would acquire more bargaining power, a bigger market and fewer 
transaction costs.22 But the plan involves big impediments along the road, requiring 
that the GCC countries should maintain a fixed peg to the US dollar. In addition, it 
stipulates low inflation rates in a region infamous for high inflation rates. This has 
been the case since 2003, due to the economic boom which coincided with the rise 
in oil prices—except for the least hydrocarbon-dependent Bahrain.23
The GCC countries have pegged their exchange rates to the US$ since 198, 
except for Kuwait, which severed these ties in May 2007. This was one of  the 
steps before the supposed monetary union, whose primary aim is to securing the 
region’s small sized and inexperienced economies.24 Many Arab-speaking countries 
have followed this route of  providing greater stability to the domestic currency 
and delivering low price inflation, at least in tradeable goods. However, a stable 
nominal exchange rate does not guarantee full domestic price stability. A fixed cur-
rency is vulnerable to swings in oil price. In light of  high oil prices and vast riches, 
their exchange rates should rise. The currency is expected to be strengthened, but 
the peg prevents nominal appreciation. In case of  a falling dollar, the result is ris-
ing domestic inflation.25 The dollar’s decline is pushing up import prices across the 
region, particularly food prices.2 Furthermore, as certain grains are diminishing 
in quality and quantity due to global warming and biofuel production, the Gulf  
countries may be faced with even higher food prices.27
Consequently, despite their budget surpluses, the Gulf ’s casting its fate with the 
dollar’s have not fared well. A recent example is the current US financial crisis that 
has brought with it negative repercussions on a global level. The reasons for this 
crisis are beyond the scope of  this paper.28 Nevertheless, the Gulf  became one 
22 Crucial Steps to Capture Gains from Integration, in: Kuwait Times, 19-10-2008. Free trade agreement was launched in 
1983, followed by the customs union in 2003 and common market in early 2008.
23 William T. Wilson, Is the GCC Ready for Monetary Union? An Economic Evaluation of  its Prospects (National Bank 
of  Kuwait GCC Research Note), 28-9-2008, pp. 2, 3, 7, 9
24 Whiteman, The GCC & the Dollar (note 4).
25 Simon Gray and Mario I. Blejer, The Gulf  Cooperation Council Region: Financial Market Development, Competitive-
ness and Economic Growth, in World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Reports, 2007, 42. Retrieved from 
<http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/chapters/_4.pdf> (accessed 29-0-2008); 
Time to break free, in: The Economist, 24-11-2007.
2 Whiteman. The GCC & the Dollar (note 4).
27 Peter Beaumont, Food riots fear after rice price hits a high, in: The Observer, -4-2008; Paul Krugman, Grains Gone 
Wild, in: The New York Times, 7-4-2008.
28 Very succintly, fueled by cheap credit, a housing bubble developed in the US from 2001 onwards. The FED followed 
a low interest policy, while the banks marketed risky mortgage products and increased lending to subprime custom-
ers. The crisis peaked in March 2007 when more than 25 subprime lenders in the US declared bankruptcy, announced 
enormous losses or put themselves up for sale.
 
Alumni Conference 2008 88
Panel IV: Economic 
Integration and Global 
Trade
of  the foremost actors that came to the aid of  the US. The Gulf  countries gave a 
helping hand to some of  subprime lenders, such as Merrill Lynch, which was in-
jected with capital by Kuwait, together with Korea, Japan and Singapore. The Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority purchased nearly 5% in Citigroup shares for a total 
$ 7.5 billion. Most importantly, the Gulf, already owning a considerable amount of  
the US Treasury debt may be expected to buy up to half  a trillion dollars worth of  
debt before the end of  2008.29
However, with an estimated $ 1.8–2 trillion in foreign assets, of  which about 0% 
are held in US $, the GCC countries are concerned about asset depreciation. The 
hitherto announced subprime exposure of  GCC banks totaling about $ 2.7 billion 
is comparatively small in the face of  US and Europe’s, which amount to more than 
$ 300 billion. However, international banks, being influential actors in local project 
finance market as they have larger capitalizations than GCC banks, face liquidity 
constraints. This might negatively affect the fate of  mega-infrastructure projects.30 
In the Dubai property market, Nakheel, the developer of  the Palm Jumeirah and 
a planned .4 km tower, announced the cut of  00 jobs and the further delay of  
some of  its projects. In Bahrain, prices have dropped as developers and home buy-
ers find it hard to get loans.31 Parenthetically, the majority of  assets in the region are 
not managed by banks, but by Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) like the Abu Dhabi, 
Kuwaiti and Qatar Investment Authorities and Bahrain Mumtalakat. Interestingly, 
the SWFs have been less affected by the current crisis despite the huge sums of  in-
vestments that are administered by these funds.32 It comes thus as no surprise that 
the US Deputy Secretary of  the Treasury Department Robert Kimmit’s recent tour 
in the Gulf  region was aimed at attracting investments from SWFs.33
Governments in the Gulf, including Kuwait’s, have already taken additional mea-
sures to stabilizing their economies by injecting, or pledging, huge amounts of  
liquidity into their banking systems. Most Gulf  nations have also further cut inter-
est rates. The latest IMF regional economic outlook forecasts economic growth in 
29 Eckart Woertz, Impact of  the US Financial Crisis on GCC Countries (Gulf  Research Center Report), Dubai, October 
2008, pp. 3–7.
30 Woertz, op. cit., pp. 8–11.
31 Bradley Hope, Gulf  economies will ‘bounce back’, in: The National (Abu Dhabi), -2-2008. Retrieved from <http://
www.thenational.ae/article/200820/BUSINESS/286460/00/rss> (accessed -2-2008). Also see The Global 
Financial Crisis and the Gulf  Cooperation Council (Brookings event), 23--2008. Retrieved from <http://www.brook-
ings.edu/events/2008/23_financial_crisis.aspx> (accessed 4-2-2008). 
32 Woertz. op. cit. (note 28), pp. 9–11. Overall $ 15 billion of  foreign currency debt (local and bonds) have to be repaid in 
the GCC in 2008 and $ 35 billion in 2009, plus $ .9 billion in local currency. The widely observed Islamic banking in 
the Gulf  is one of  the reasons for immunity against the crisis. Its closed system incorporates provisions for protect-
ing wealth and financial interests, in the present case most notably by a comparatively low level of  integration into the 
global financial market.
33 Gulf, the Savior in the time of  crisis, --2008. Retrieved from <http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/StoryPrint.
aspx?ID=NEWEN2008000804&ch=633644443630> (accessed 2--2008).
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the Gulf  region will slip to .% in 2009 from an estimated 7.1% in 2008.34 Stock 
markets in GCC countries witnessed a big downturn last October, losing nearly 
$ 200 billion in a few days.35 There is also the prospect of  reduced demand for 
crude oil and products, not to mention the slump in petrochemical and aluminum 
products of  GCC’s newly launched heavy industries.3
It might be best for the Gulf  states as well as the global economy if  the states 
followed the Kuwaiti example of  shifting to a currency basket. A more flexible 
exchange-rate regime would allow them to liberate themselves from America’s 
monetary policy, which has rendered real interest rates too low for such fast-grow-
ing economies. Furthermore, the GCC’s imports from America accounted for a 
meagre 10% compared to one-third from Europe and Asia, respectively. Against 
this background, the dollar peg makes little sense. In a similar vein, 20% of  the 
EU’s energy demand is met by the GCC.37 The main argument against a deliberate 
rise in the exchange rate would be its harmful effect on the competitiveness of  the 
non-oil sector in economies that are in dire need to diversify. However, when the 
dollar gained strength in the late 1990s, non-oil industries were hurt coincidentally 
as the price of  crude was sliding. Hence, more flexibility through a trade-weighted 
basket in which the euro had a larger weight would stabilize the real exchange rate 
of  the GCC countries and further enhance their competitiveness. On the other 
hand, oil exporters argue that oil is priced in dollars which reduces exchange-rate 
risks. Nevertheless, exchange-rate stability does not necessarily bring about eco-
nomic stability. On the contrary, a more flexible currency would enable economies 
to handle oil-price shocks better.38 One last argument for injecting flexibility to 
Gulf  economies is that, since most big currencies belong to oil importers, the 
Gulf  States would be linking their currencies to unsuitable monetary conditions. 
Accordingly, including the oil price as part of  a basket that includes the leading 
currencies, would absorb some of  the negative impact of  oil swings.39
In a similar vein, the region is still taking baby steps on its way to diversifying 
economies. The Gulf  countries must therefore allocate more revenues to R&D 
34 Gulf  states to seek common front to tackle crisis, in: Gulf  Times (Qatar), 2-0-2008. Retrieved from <http://
www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=208&version=&template_id=48> (accessed 
25-10-2008).
35 Ghazanfar Ali K Han, GCC to unify stand against crisis, in: Arab News, 26-0-2008. Retrieved from <http://www.
arabnews.com/?page=6&section=0&article=80&d=26&m=0&y=2008> (accessed 28-0-2008).
3 Woertz, op. cit. (note 28), pp. 12–19.
37 The EU has a region-to-region relationship with the GCC through a cooperation agreement in 1988. The Agreement 
aims at broadening economic and technical cooperation and also cooperation in energy, industry, trade and services, 
agriculture and science. See The EU and the Gulf  Coopeation Council (GCC), Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/intro/index.htm> (accessed 29-0-2008).
38 The Petrodollar Peg, in: The Economist, 9-12-200. 
39 Time to break free, op. cit. (note 24).
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and try to further their knowledge and experience in the finance, services, deriva-
tives and construction sector. Furthermore, the GCC region cannot compete with 
the history of  Egypt or some of  the ancient cities in the Levant and North Africa 
when it comes to tourism.40 According to the Travel and Tourism Competitiveness 
Index Report 2008, the Gulf  region was less competitive in terms of  travel and 
tourism industries than the year before. While UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait 
slipped down in the respective rankings, Oman and Saudi Arabia were newcom-
ers in a survey of  130 countries.41 Accordingly, the Gulf  countries should increase 
their efforts in promoting their touristic assets, while taking initiatives to host 
international sports or cultural activities.
Apart from structural economic problems that beset the region, there are also 
other factors that may create havoc despite considerable wealth. Al-Qaida targets 
the supplies of  Muslim-produced oil on which Western economies depended. On 
the other hand, it does not seek to cause irreparable economic damage to the re-
gion. Accordingly, al-Qaida seeks to damage the infrastructure needed for refining 
and transporting oil: pipelines, refineries and seaport, rather than the oil wells as 
such.42 Likewise, these mostly pro-US regimes of  the Gulf  incur the wrath of  Iran, 
for the latter’s alienation from the energy market.43 Such threats eventually cause a 
rise in defense budgets and drain the treasury. It would be best for the GCC coun-
tries to strengthen their cooperation with the Western countries in the fight against 
al-Qaida. Likewise, maintaining alternatives to shipments of  oil from the Persian 
Gulf  through the Strait of  Hormuz could be beneficial in reducing Iranian lever-
age over the strait and reducing the chances of  its closure in order to disrupt the 
flow of  oil. A similar problem is observed in the Red Sea region, where Somali pi-
rates have been harassing and hijacking ships including, for example, Saudi-owned 
tankers carrying oil. This constitutes another stumbling block, hindering the flow 
of  oil to Europe and the United States.44 In addition to the hitherto efforts of  the 
International Maritime Organization to curb Somalian piracy, the United States, 
China and Gulf  countries may set up an ad hoc multinational convention to guar-
antee freedom of  the seas. In the face of  dependence on Persian Gulf  oil, Asian 
countries would be more than willing for any multilateral initiative that would 
make supplies from the region more secure.45
40 Gray and Blejer, op. cit. (note 24), p. 44.
41 Oman a fast growing travel and tourism economy, in: Times of  Oman, 28--2008. Retrieved from <https://www.zawya.
com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA2008028043646> (accessed 9--2008).
42 Michael Scheuer, Al-Qaeda and the Oil Target, in Michael Scheuer, Stephen Ulph and John C. K. Daly, Saudi Arabian 
Oil Facilities: the Achilles Heel of  the Western Economy (The Jamestown Foundation), Washington, DC, 200, p. 8.
43 Joe Barnes and Amy Myers Jaffe, The Persian Gulf  and the Geopolitics of  Oil, in: Survival, Spring 200, pp. 149, 
15–157.
44 Jenny Booth, Somali pirates demand $ 25m ransom for supertanker, in: The Times, 20-11-2008.
45 See Barnes and Jaffe, op. cit. (note 42).
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Finally, to some extent all Gulf  countries suffer domestically because of  fast rising 
populations and the lack of  a skilled domestic work force, which attracts foreign 
labor.4 Despite official strategies like Saudization, Emiratization or Omanization 
to encourage employment of  Gulf  nationals47, many men and women from Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, not to mention Western experts arrive to the Gulf  in 
flux. Saudi Arabia’s rate of  unemployment still stands at 2% despite efforts to 
provide qualified education like Effat College, a private women’s college that oper-
ates in partnership with Duke University to educate women engineers.48 The prob-
lem is most clearly evident in the United Arab Emirates, where foreigners account 
for more than 90% of  the private-sector labour force.49 Even though many GCC 
countries since the 1990s have been hosting renowned American schools or train-
ing exercises run by companies such as Toyota or DHL, private sector employers 
favor cheap and hard-working Asian expatriates.50 The high revenues in the oil sec-
tor has led to high wages and subsidies for public sector jobs offered to domestic 
workers, who did not have additional incentives to acquire further skills. Saudi and 
Kuwaiti levels of  public spending on education prove their function as a role mod-
el for the rest of  the Gulf  countries. There is also a low quality of  teachers due to 
lack of  teaching skills and knowledge of  recent teaching and learning techniques. 
This is also related to the fact that the educational system is biased against tech-
nical fields and most of  the students in higher education are to be found in the 
humanities and social sciences. Another implication of  the generally low level of  
skills is the poor local technological capacity. For the UAE case, lack of  technol-
ogy policy, R&D and technological culture results in a strong dependence on for-
eign expertise in this field.51 This dual nature of  employment in the Gulf  in which 
domestic workers are employed in the public sector whereas foreign workers are 
in the private sectors should be dealt with. Change in the economic structure of  
the Gulf  economies can only be possible through due incentives and policies to 
improve skills. Yet another problem is brain drain. The governments will also have 
to provide incentives to make skilled natives return to their former home, which 
would then pioneer indigenous industrialization and modern education.
Parenthetically, it is now widely acknowledged that Norway, one of  the world’s 
largest petroleum exporters, has been making the best use of  its oil revenues 
against the background of  depleting resources and a post-carbon future. Its oil 
4 P. K. Abdul Ghafour, 470,000 Saudis Are Jobless, Says Study, in: Arab News, 15-4-2007.
47 These policies involve both “carrot and stick” tactics, which, at worst, may go as far as withholding government con-
tracts from foreign companies in the Gulf  failing to employ a certain number of  Gulf  nationals.
48 Clatanoff, Parlin, Jordan et al., op. cit. (note 11), p. 15.
49 Labor Rations in the Gulf, in: The Economist, 3-9-2008. 
50 Young, rich, idle, like it or not, in: The Economist, 20-9-1997.
51 Joan Muysken and Samia Noir, Deficiencies in Education and Poor Prospects for Economic Growth in the Gulf  Coun-
tries: The Case of  the UAE, in: Journal of  Development Studies, August 200, pp. 91, 94–95, 971, 974. 
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fund, namely the Government Pension Fund, which is worth an estimated $ 390 
billion, ranks second after that of  the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi Invest-
ment Authority) among funds run by governments. It differs from those in the 
Emirates due to its transparency with respect to its strategy and fields of  invest-
ments. It is known that its investment in any company mostly amounts to less than 
1 percent of  available shares. This precludes any catastrophic consequence in bad 
or uncertain times.52 As a mature democracy, in Norway, political competition over 
economic performance has created a strong constituency for sound economic 
management involving both the state and private sector. However, the paternalistic 
autocracies in the Gulf  have been involved in incessant state spending for the sake 
of  sustaining political support. This not only generates further commitments, but 
also unproductive, overstaffed bureaucracies and protected, inept enterprises. It is 
very likely that the Gulf  countries will no longer be able to use the public sector to 
employ all new entrants to the labor market. There is the urgent need to accelerate 
non-oil private sector growth in order to generate new job opportunities. Further-
more, resistance to transparency and adherence to the legitimizing force of  oil-led 
state spending pave the way towards corruption and create difficulties in a period 
of  partial political and economic transition. It would therefore be more beneficial 
for Gulf  countries if  they did not simply shower their people with money, but pro-
vide sums for those who are needy or whose projects serve wider public interests, 
including job opportunities outside the oil sector. Introducing a merit-based system 
for the workforce, putting forth incentives for development of  skills and creating a 
culture of  tax-paying in the longer term not only would lead to more qualified and 
responsible manpower who would help develop the country, but also save money 
for unfortunate times such as the current period of  the global financial crisis.53
What to do
To conclude, the rise of  the Gulf  is neither myth or reality. While these countries 
have a considerably successful record in integrating with the global economy 
through investment as well as modernization and diversification of  regional econ-
omies, their prosperity is not a panacea for the internal and external constraints 
that render the region vulnerable. Wealth should be multiplied via a currency 
basket and then directed to educational and promotional activities that would 
augment the number of  skilled domestic workers as well as tourists and investors. 
Alternative energy projects and further diversification of  economy should also be 
52 Robin Wigglesworth and Simon Kennedy, Norway provides model on how to manage oil revenue, in: International 
Herald Tribune, -0-200, and Tarjei Kidd Olsen, Norway: Oil Fund Pursues Socially Responsible Investments, in: 
Inter Press Service English News Wire, 3--2008. Retrieved from <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/P-40.
html> (accessed 4-2-2008).
53 Benn Eiffert, Alan Gelb, Nils Tallroth, Managing oil wealth: The political economy of  oil-exporting countries—why 
some of  them have done so poorly, in: Finance & Development (IMF), 2003.
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catalyzed through importing knowledge and experts or sending natives abroad to 
learn the business. Last but not least, international cooperation not only would 
secure the region from possible threats to the oil flow, but also create a favorable 
atmosphere for new markets or trade agreements.
The closing session with the rapporteurs
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